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This thesis explores the history of the urban development and architectural changes in 
Washington, D.C. Chinatown in the late twentieth century. Urban development in 
D.C. Chinatown traces the way in which local politics, ethnic community elites and 
the larger international backdrop of geopolitics and the globalizing economy found 
expression in the visual streetscapes and architecture in the neighborhood perceived 
to be a predominantly ethnic site. This essay argues that the case of D.C. Chinatown 
represents a larger call for a spatial turn in Chinese American history, where more 
emphasis can be placed on the uses of symbolic architecture in determining Chinese 
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Introduction: D.C. Chinatown, Then and Now 
Just off the National Mall, in the heart of downtown Washington, D.C., many 
tourists take a quick break from the rounds of monuments by having lunch at the area 
around 7th and H Street, NW. Known as Gallery Place/Chinatown by the red lin  
Metro hub that disgorges crowds of people at regular intervals, the small six-block 
radius of commercial frontage is lined with restaurants such as Legal Seafoods, or 
clothing chains like Urban Outfitters. At the busiest intersection, a big screen 
television monitor blares a constantly changing slideshow of commercial and news. 
The bright lights of the television monitor and the flash of car headlights as they 
stream continuously down H Street, reflect off the saffron tiles of the giant, Chinese 
archway that spans 7th Street. Echoing the Chinese script on the Archway, every 
store, from CVS to Hooters, has an adjoining street sign declaring its Chinese name. 
This is a brief but brightly lit snapshot of Washington D.C.’s Chinatown today, in 
2009, with its strange intermingling of overt Chineseness laid atop commercial chain 
stores. But if we rewind the camera of time, about forty years ago, the same strip of 
downtown D.C. would be a far cry from the bustling commercial center it is today. 
Instead, there would be quiet, empty streets with older Chinese men sitting on their 
stoops playing fan-tan, or watching from their small apartment windows at an empty 
lot, where Chinese teenagers play volleyball on the weekends.1 If it were a Sunday, 
we would hear the African American church choirs singing, in the Turner African 
Memorial Episcopal Church or New Hope Baptist. In between hymns, we might see 
and feel the rumble of an occasional large truck as it drives down ‘furniture row,’ 
                                                
1 Betty Medsger, “Chinatown Not Home to Most Chinese,” The Washington Post, December 5, 1972.  
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where Leon Weinraub, among other merchants, have had their furniture stores, some 
open and bustling, others closed and their space for rent, for the last twenty-five 
years. What happened in the last forty years to turn this scene in 1972 of small stores 
and crumbling rowhouses into the flashy commercial success it is today? This essay 
will attempt to replay the camera of time and focus, as we roll sl wly over the 
decades between the 1970s to the 1990s, on the many people, players, emotions and 
motivations that transformed this place in D.C. called Chinatown.  
The period of the 1970s to the 1990s marked a time of incredible building and 
development in Chinatown. However, what makes this period particularly int iguing 
is that this commercial development became wrapped up in the blanket of ethnic 
pride and cultural tourism via public facades. Why did the D.C. government pursue 
efforts to partner with the Chinese community despite the fact th t it was one of the 
smallest Chinatowns in the country?2  In this essay, we will try to answer this 
question by examining some of the more compelling aspects of this partnership – the 
institution of Chinatown design guidelines that required developers to submit their 
blueprints to a panel which then decided if they had enough Chinese elements in their 
proposed designs, to the construction of the D.C. Friendship Archway, which as 
partly funded by the Beijing government through the auspices of the D.C. mayor of 
the time, Marion Barry. We will also take a look at the hidden tensions between 
factions within the community. These factions include the pro-Taiwan and pro-
Beijing Chinese immigrants, the historic preservationists who included part of 
Chinatown in the downtown Historic District application, to the various merchants 
                                                
2 Steven Knipp, “Lost in Transformation: Can A Tiny American Chinatown Survive Its Success?” 
Pacific News Service, May 12, 2005.  
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along 7th Street, some of whom opposed and some of whom welcomed the promise of 
development. Although we will be training our lenses closely on this particul r case 
study of D.C. Chinatown, we will also bring in to bear the larger forces of the time 
period, as well as take into consideration the historical literature, o better understand 
why people might have acted and reacted the way they did.  
There are many strands interwoven in this story of commercial development 
and cultural preservation and it behooves us to begin with an understanding of where 
these multiple historical writings intersect. The historical literature on Chinatowns, 
Washington, D.C. as well as architectural urban history all provide some useful 
analytical tools with which to view D.C. Chinatown but each strand fails to take into 
consideration some aspect of the story of D.C. Chinatown and its positioning in the 
larger story of cities, Chinese communities and the symbolic uses of public 
architecture.  
Although the literature on Chinatown and Washington, D.C. provide a useful, 
historical context for our study of D.C. Chinatown, neither of these fi lds reflect upon 
D.C. Chinatown’s marketed ethnicity and how the preservation of Chinatown 
expressed itself in the form of architectural and visual elements. It is instead, in a few 
and scattered essays in the field of architectural history that the first forays into 
understanding this spatial aspect of Chinatown history is begun. This essay will 
attempt to knit these strands together to better understand the par icular case of D.C. 
Chinatown and how its story can fill a niche in the larger narrative of immigrant 





Writing Washington, D.C. History  
 Before we adjust our analytical lenses to zoom in on the case of D.C. 
Chinatown in particular, it will be helpful to zoom out and look at how the
experiences of the Chinese community fit into the larger physical community of DC 
itself.  
The historical literature of Washington, D.C. is rife with books discus ing the 
creation of the capital, the prime example of people seeking to create in a physical 
space an idea and a mythology. In Fergus M. Bordewich’s “Washington: The Making 
of the American Capital,” which represents the most recent in a lo g string of popular 
history books focusing on the 18th century plans for Washington, D.C., Bordewich 
writes:  
“the invention of Washington, D.C. is in part a soaring story of 
national aspiration, in part a cautionary tale of the first great land-
grabbing boondoggle in American history and in part a grim record of 
slavery’s buried history. It is much more than the story of the mere 
physical construction of a city where none existed before…ultimately 
it is an epic tale of the often faltering, sometimes delusional, and 
ultimately triumphant quest to create the first great physical symbol 
[italics added] of the nation’s identity.”3  
 
 Bordewich’s book understands in depth the uses of space and architecture, as part of 
the quest to create a sense of identity and informs much of the history written about 
Washington, D.C. However, very little is actually written about the actual residents 
and communities living in Washington, D.C. Much is made of the statesmen who 
sought to create the monuments and federal buildings that represent Am rican ideals 
today, but there is not as much on the smaller neighborhoods or communities actually 
                                                




living and working in D.C. Although Bordewich’s book does try to untangle the 
buried history of slavery in Washington, it is does so to uncover their part in creating 
the mythical, federal Washington, not to tell their story as their lived experience in 
Washington, D.C.  
David Lewis’s “District of Columbia, A Bicentennial History,” does a better 
job, in 1976, in telling the hidden story of Washington’s residential communities. In 
his book, written as part of a larger project, organized by the Amrican Association 
for State and Local History, he pays greater attention to the people actually living in 
Washington, D.C. in the section titled “Behind the Marble Mask,” where Lewis 
consciously references the tendency of scholars and visitors alike, to see only the 
federal history and experience of Washington via its marble monuments and 
buildings. This effort to expand upon the local history of Washington turns its 
attention to the African American lived experience in Washington, noting the changes 
in demographic and land use in Logan Circle, for instance. Although Lewis’s history 
does an admirable job of uncovering the much neglected history of the significant and 
historic African American population in the city, Lewis does not, in 1976, pay much 
attention to the other ethnic minorities or other residential groups also prevalent in 
D.C.  
It is however, Francine Curro Cary’s compilation of historical essay  that make 
up the book, “Washington Odyssey: A Multicultural History of the Nation’s Capital,” 
that is the seminal work that does justice in writing the histories of the multiple ethnic 
communities present in Washington, D.C. Again, Cary unconsciously references the 
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symbolic importance of the built environment when telling the history of Washington, 
D.C: 
“interspersed among the national monuments and federal buildings that 
dot the urban landscape of Washington are other institutions – both 
religious and secular – that stand as silent sentinels in a citywhose role 
as the nation’s capital has eclipsed its own history. If these structures of 
myriad purpose, lineage and architecture could speak, they would tell 
the untold stories of the community-building efforts of thousands of 
migrants and immigrants who came to Washington in search of 
opportunity, and stayed to shape the social fabric of an evolving city and 
changing region.”4  
 
Cary’s compilation encompasses a broad sweep of communities: the first section 
telling the story of Native Americans, African Americans and Irish merchants who 
were living in the area before D.C. became the capital. The second section, the largest 
section of the book, is titled “Race, Ethnicity, Class and Community Building,” 
tracing the hectic nineteenth and early twentieth century, and the origins of multiple 
immigrant communities, from the Germans, the Jewish, the Greek to the Chinese. 
This section is the one that most compellingly portrays the book’s claim that “the 
common thread…is the quest for community, a quest embodied in efforts t  
transplant cultural traditions and rebuild familiar social networks, rituals and support 
institutions on unfamiliar terrain.”5  
 One can thus see this shift towards telling local history, and within that, of its 
social and cultural landscapes, as particularly distinct during the mor  recent era of 
the 1990s and 2000s. However, although the study of D.C. Chinatown would fall 
within that trend of looking to expand upon local social and cultural history, the case 
of D.C. Chinatown also reflects upon the growing need to understand the importance 
                                                
4 Francine Curro Cary, ed., Washington Odyssey: A Multicultural History of the Nation’s Capital, 
(Washington and London: Smithsonian Books, 1996), xiii. 
5 Ibid, xiv 
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of symbolic architecture in local history and urban minority populations’ desire to 
create community via myth-making architecture. Thus, this study will be able to fill 
in the gap of the story of the D.C.’s Chinese community in both Chinatow and D.C. 
historical literature. In doing so, this study’s focus on the role of architecture in the 
redevelopment of D.C. Chinatown will also help to expand the repertoire of analytical 
tools, to use the visual streetscape to tell a fuller story of a community. Thus, to 
respond to Cary’s introduction, who wishes that these “silent sentinels…could 
speak,” this essay argues that they can and will speak of a rich cultural and complex 
history, if we ask the right questions. 
A Spatial Turn in Chinese American History? 
Architecture as a form of cultural expression and myth-making thus s ould 
not be solely the purview of the European mainstream, as dictated by the lists of the 
National Register of Historic Places, which seems to imply, given the dominance of 
its chosen buildings, that a place is historic when it is important in the European 
narrative of American history. We need to become more aware of the visual 
streetscapes of Chinese American communities as much as we take note of the 
economic, artistic or literary forms of Chinese American identity, to better understand 
the expressions in which ethnic community identity and transformation take place in 
Chinese America. 
External Discrimination and Internal Enclaves in Chinatown Formation 
The historical literature on Chinatowns has been numerous, but Chinatown 
scholars discussing the urban formation of Chinatowns have often revolved around 
two main factors – the ‘push’ effect of racial discrimination by a non-Chinese, white 
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majority or the ‘pull’ effect of the social and economic advantages of living with 
other co-ethnics in an enclave. The early sociological literature on Chinatowns, 
exemplified by Rose Hum Lee, writing in the early 1940s, is informed by this 
assumption, arguing that as immigrants assimilate due to upward mobility and 
diminishing racism, “it appears that the number of Chinatowns in this country will 
decrease almost to the vanishing point. Only those of historical or commercial 
importance, as in San Francisco and New York, will remain.”6 Similarly although 
with a different conclusion, Kay Anderson, writing about Vancouver’s Chinatown, 
also framed her discussion of Vancouver’s Chinatown on racial formation: “the book 
attempts to demonstrate empirically the workings of the racialization processes about 
which theorists have written.”7 Although Anderson explicitly traces the growth of 
Chinatown from the perspective of the predominantly white Vancouver society, she 
seeks to reveal the essentialist nature of racial stereotyping, from the overtly 
exclusionary period of the 1800s to the more subtle but, to Anderson, just as 
essentialist forms of tourist Chinatown in the name of multiculturalism and historic 
preservation in the 1960s to the 1980s.  
This focus on race formation, assimilation theories and external factors 
ignores the community’s own motivations in the historic preservation of their 
physical communities. The study of D.C. Chinatown, particularly in the case of their 
redevelopment in the late twentieth century, will show us how these motivations can 
                                                
6 Rose Hum Lee, “The Decline of Chinatowns in the United States,” The American Journal of 
Sociology 54, no.5 (1949):432. 
7 Kay J. Anderson, Vancouver’s Chinatown: Racial Discourse in Chinatown, 1875-1980 (Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1991), p3.
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sometimes make them complicit in furthering racial stereotypes and enclaves that 
Anderson and Lee seem to argue against.  
In addition, the race relations focus of Anderson and Lee, creates an exter al 
frame of reference locates the power of the workings of Chinatown n external 
forces. In considering the history of D.C. Chinatown we need to look at studies which 
turn inward, at the ‘pull’ factor of ethnic enclaves. These studies tend to celebrate the 
historic Chinatown community, rather than focusing on its eventual integration into 
mainstream society. One classic Chinatown work in this style is by Victor and Brett 
De Bary Nee, in their documentary study of San Francisco Chinatow  in the 1970s. 
Nee and Nee seeks to highlight the length of the history of the Chinese community in 
America and their ability to carve a particular place for themselves in society. Their 
book, unlike Rose Hum Lee, celebrates the historical enclave, rather than the 
temporary ghetto. Peter Kwong, who writes on New York Chinatown does a simil r 
inward turn, arguing in his book, “The New Chinatown” written in 1987, that 
Chinatown’s inability to move forward is based on its very nature as isolated from the 
larger American political and economic mainstream. In “The New Chinatown,” 
Kwong notes that there are many factors maintaining the non-integration of Chinese 
communities, not the least of which is “dominance in their communities of a 
traditional political structure.”8 This is in direct contrast to Rose Hum Lee’s claim 
that “Chinatown [has] no independent economic structure but [is] attached 
symbiotically to the larger economic, political and social base.”9 In this way, Nee and 
Nee as well as Kwong argue that both the social community and the political stru ture 
                                                
8 Peter Kwong, The New Chinatown (New York: Hill and Wang, 1987), 7-8. 
9 Lee, 421. 
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of Chinatown heralds the physical and continued significance of downtown 
Chinatown enclaves. This essay’s case study of D.C. Chinatown thus seek  to move 
away from the focus on assimilation theories that permeate the earli r literature and 
delve more deeply into the internal workings of the enclave as Nee and Nee and 
Kwong do.  
Downtown and Suburb – Never the Twain Shall Meet?  
However, although Nee and Nee and Kwong both do a good job in countering 
the earlier literature’s focus on race relations, they stillpresume upon a firm 
distinction between downtown and suburban Chinese communities. Indeed, Kwong 
actively argues that the success and geographic distance of uptown Chinese (who 
would be predominantly suburban) obscures the plight of downtown Chinese. Wei Li
a scholar who focuses on ethnic suburbs, argues that “ethnic suburbs have been 
replacing traditional inner-city enclaves as the more important “ports of entry” for 
new immigrants in some large metropolitan areas.”10 However, these studies that 
focus on the distinct characteristics of the historic downtown enclave and the newly 
emerging ethnic suburbs fails to take into consideration the fact th t here continues 
to be tangible and intangible connections between the suburban community and he 
downtown enclave, as the case of D.C. Chinatown will show.  
Michel S. Laguerre, studying San Francisco’s ethnic enclaves, tea es out these 
tangible and intangible connections and attempts to break down this artificial physical 
barrier between suburban communities and historic downtowns. Laguerre does not 
see ethnoburbs as replacing the downtown ethnic enclaves. To Laguerre, an 
                                                
10 Wei Li, ed., From Urban Enclave to Ethnic Suburb: New Asian Communities in Pacific Rim 
Countries (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006), 15. 
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“ethnopolis” is a place “that refers not only to enclosure and physical boundaries, but 
implies the implosion of the ethnic enclave as a center to which satellite clusters of 
the population may be connected.”11 Instead, Laguerre seeks to trace the social as 
well as economic connections between these satellite ethnoburbs and their 
relationship to the downtown ethnopolis. Laguerre notes that the ethnopolis is:  
“for second and third generations, it is the place where they grew up, 
the site that holds their parents’ memories about the homeland, and 
their space of symbolic attachment. For members of the ethnic enclav  
living outside of the enclave, it is their capital city: it is the place they 
do their marketing for homeland products, where they visit on 
holidays, eat native foods, meet friends, and keep in touch with 
homeland traditions.”12 
 
Laguerre thus highlights the importance of symbolic and historic attachments to a 
particular space, even if there is no longer a true economic structure or physical 
residence in the space. This aspect, missing in discussions in the literature about 
assimilation, suburbanization and Chinese American history, is an important point to 
note when analyzing a community’s construction of space. The case of D.C. 
Chinatown, where the majority of the community resides outside of D.C. but felt such 
a strong historic and symbolic connection to the deteriorating downtown that they 
fought over the Archway and sought to institute design guidelines for a place they no 
longer resided in, will provide a useful example in which we can analyze the pull of 
attachment to a historic space. 
The Role of Architecture in Chinatown  
Although Laguerre is able to deftly argue for the blurring of the lin s between 
downtown and the suburbs and touches upon the spatial connections between the 
                                                
11 Michel S. Laguerre, The Global Ethnopolis: Chinatown, Japantown and Manilatown in American 
Society (New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000), 11. 
12 Ibid, 15. 
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communities, he does not fully take into account the role of urban planning a d visual 
architecture in the formation and preservation of downtown Chinatowns, which 
becomes particularly apparent in the late twentieth century. This occurs not only in 
Washington, D.C. but in many cities across the United States, Canada d Australia. 
This remarkable similarity across international and national boundaries thus indicates 
that there might be a larger impulse motivating communities than race relations, 
economic benefits or the desire to assimilate into white society.  
David Lai, a professor of geography at the University of Victora, is one of the 
first proponents for considering the role of architecture in Chinatowns.13 Lai’s 
conceptualization, which classifies the physical growth of Chinatowns into four 
categories: surviving Old Chinatowns, New Chinatowns (which emerged aft r the 
Second World War), Replaced Chinatowns, built to replace demolished Old 
Chinatowns and Reconstructed Historic Chinatowns, helps to insert a spaial element 
into the understanding of Chinese communities and culture. In addition, his 
comprehensive study helps us compare the similarities and differences across 
Chinatowns, to see what might be shared elements of experience and wh t might be 
particular to local situations, such as in Washington, D.C. However, Lai’s background 
and training as a geographer as well as his personal participation in Chinatown 
architectural monuments in Victoria, leads him to focus on the more specific physical 
characteristics than on the symbolic impact and complex motivations surrounding 
their creation and preservation.14 
                                                
13 David Chuenyan Lai, Chinatowns: Towns within Cities in Canada, (Victoria, Canada: University of 
British Columbia Press), 1988. 
14 David Chuenyan Lai, Building and Rebuilding Harmony: The Gateway to Victoria’s Chinatown 
(Victoria, Canada: University of British Columbia Press), 1997. 
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Marie Rose Wong’s more recent study provides greater analysis on the symbolic 
impact of spatial and architectural character of Chinatown. Wong, in a section titled 
“Culture and ‘Built-to-Suit’ Architecture,”15 describes the architecture of early 1900s 
Portland Chinatown as buildings with their ‘Oriental’ components such as pagoda-
style roofs, turrets, upturned eaves, balconies etc, that were decorative elements that 
paid “historic reference to the cultural forms [but] were not structurally or 
functionally authentic as in traditional Chinese architecture.”16 Instead, Wong argues, 
that “it is critical to recognize that Chinatowns were cultural hybrids, neither purely 
American nor purely Chinese.”17 Wong continues to note that: 
“Chinatown was not created by abrupt boundaries such as fences, but by 
indicators in the built environment [italics added] that visually separated 
the enclave from the surrounding community. These elements included the 
residents’ homes and businesses, signs expressing their language, 
ornament (flags, banners and statues), use of color, kinetic occurrences 
such as open markets or commercial fruit and vegetable stands that 
physically defined the area, and the presence of Chinese people as part of 
the regular identity of specific city blocks. Combined, these intuit ve 
boundaries created an image that became recognized over time by both the 
peer society and the ethnic community, and in great part, these elem nts 
remain as the reliable identifiers of the appearance of Chinatown in a  
historical and contemporary sense.”18  
 
And yet, despite Wong’s astute observations regarding the social and psychological 
impact of architecture on the urban form of Chinatown, she does not go beyond the 
time period of 1950 to examine the Chinatown in Portland in the 1980s and see how 
these culturally hybrid yet reliable identifiers continue to wrk in the late twentieth 
century. Wong herself noted in the beginning of her book that Portland dedicated 
                                                
15 Marie Rose Wong, Sweet Cakes, Long Journey: The Chinatowns of Portland, Oregon, (Seattle and 
London: University of Washington Press, 2004), 220. 
16 Ibid., 222. 
17 Ibid., 221. 
18 Ibid., 265. 
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their official Chinatown Gateway in 1986 (the same year that D.C. built their Arch) 
and was also involved, as Wong observed, “like many Chinatowns, in fighting to 
retain its ethnic historic identity and preserve the economic viability of its shops and 
restaurants under the pressures of urban change.”19. In addition, Wong does not seek 
to reconcile the impact of architecture and its imagined boundaries, w th what she 
distinguishes as the formation of enclaves versus non-claves. Wong argues that 
enclaves are created based on acts of violence or explicit legislation, such as in San 
Francisco, which forces Chinese to seek refuge in their own urban communities. In 
contrast, Wong states that in Portland, “although city authorities monitored the 
specific location of Chinese American activities, the white community as a whole did 
not use violence or local legislation to coerce immigrants into lving or working only 
in certain areas.”20 According to Wong, this lack of coercion thus allowed Chinese 
immigrants in Portland to develop a non-clave, which has no locational restrictions 
and the community grows in a diffuse and scattered pattern. This is the underlying 
reason, for Wong, that Old Chinatown gave way to the city’s growth and 
redevelopment and left room for the “Chinese themselves [to be] active participants 
in determining their future in Portland and in deciding on the eventual loc tion of 
their business community.”21  
Wong’s analysis and case study thus provides us with much food for thought 
to an alternative spatial model than the ones presented by San Francisco or even 
Victoria or Vancouver, all of which, given their larger communities, faced violence 
and discriminatory legislation on a wider scale. Portland’s scattered community and 
                                                
19 Wong, p3 
20 Wong, p266 
21 Wong, p270 
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disappearing original Chinatown could be a more useful reference point to compare 
the experience of D.C. Chinatown than to larger Chinatowns such as San Francisco or 
New York. However, despite the new angles of analysis that Wong’s book provides, 
her conclusions still leave several gaps to be explored. Wong does not reconcil  her 
claims about the importance of the architecture and the built environment in 
determining Chinatown’s boundaries with her discussion of enclaves versus non-
claves. Why would a non-clave such as Portland or Washington, D.C. with its 
scattered and diffuse population and lack of coercion or discrimination, have the 
incentive to build such Chinese structures that proclaimed a historic district that did 
not have the same connections and internal, self-contained structure that larger 
enclaves possessed?   
Anna Lisa Mak, writing about the Chinatown in Sydney, Australia, goes into 
greater detail about the significance of architecture in this form of place-creation and 
solidifying of the mythology of Chinese diasporas seeking to belong but at the same 
time, seeking to proclaim their cultural heritage, in a host country with a largely 
European population. Mak focuses on how Sydney’s tourist industry created a 
repackaged and more palatable form of tourist Chinatown for the consumption of 
non-Chinese visitors: 
“complicity of members of the Chinese community in the design and 
construction of Chinatown created an interesting tension that 
complicates the theories of western domination….in a joint decision 
by the council and the Dixon Street Chinese Committee, the 
appearance of Chinatown was deliberately designed to conform to 
accepted notions of what a Chinatown should be. The Dixon Street 
Chinese Committee exercised its agency in exploiting these notions of 
Chinatown for profit, undermining the premise that these notions were 
imposed solely by the west. The reconstructed identity, though define 
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and constructed by the west, became a partially self-imposed 
stereotype for the sake of economic gain.” 22   
 
Although Mak deftly teases out these complicated dimensions of the Chin se 
community’s own motivations, her final conclusion, that these Orientalizing 
architectural forms were done solely on the basis of economic gain, overlooks the 
more complex psychological and social motivations of the Chinese community. The 
role of architecture in these scholarly works on Chinatown formation, character and 
preservation is often secondary to the larger goal of explicating a Chinese 
community’s social history and these nuggets of information about the role of 
architecture is often mentioned in asides or tangential sub-chapters, rather than as a 
predominant factor in Chinatown history. Instead, we have to turn to the realm of 
architectural history rather than Chinese American history and sociology to find 
scholars who reflect upon the primary impact of architecture on ide tity formation 
and social cohesion in Chinese communities, rather than purely through race and 
economic forces.  
David Lai, who wrote the comprehensive comparative study on Chinatowns in 
Canada, also wrote a more recent article titled “The Visual Character of 
Chinatowns,”23 highlighting and reiterating the importance of the built environment 
in our understanding of Chinese communities. Similarly Christopher Yip wrote a 
detailed study called, “Association, Residence and Shop: An Appropriati n of 
Commercial Blocks in North American Chinatowns,” wherein Yip argues that the 
architectural facades of association buildings help to “[create] a special identity for 
                                                
22 Anna-Lisa Mak, “Negotiating Identity: Ethnicity, Tourism and Chinatown,” Journal of Australian 
Studies 77 (2003), http://api-network.com/main/pdf/scholars/jas77_mak.pdf 
23 David Chuenyan Lai, "The Visual Character of Chinatowns [Vision, Culture and Landscape]", 
Places: 7, no. 1 (1990), http://repositories.cdlib.org/ced/places/vol7/iss1/DavidChuenyanLai 
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the urban Chinatowns of the Pacific Coast.”24 More recently and particularly 
pertinent, Jia Lou has written about the signs in D.C. Chinatown, where “the language 
choice, text vector, symmetrical composition and physical emplacement of signs in 
contemporary Chinatown with those in Chinatown at the beginning of the 20th 
century has revealed a Chinatown that is simultaneously old and new.” 25 The aim and 
audience of the project is both the community and urban historians as Lou writes that, 
“it is hoped that this critical semiotic analysis of Chinatown’s shop signs will alert the 
involved parties as well as observers of the complexity involved in urban 
revitalization programs.”26  
In this way the burgeoning trend in discussions of symbolic architecture can 
knit together the literature on Chinatowns and Washington D.C. history. B th these 
fields have separate impulses motivating the two historiographical traditions – a 
concern with assimilation theories be it physical or cultural, in the books on 
Chinatown, and a focus on D.C.’s architectural history and symbolism circa the 
1800s, for histories about Washington, D.C. When considered together, through the 
lens of symbolic architecture, the case of D.C. Chinatown thus fills a gap in both 
literatures – it highlights the importance of architectural symbolism and how it plays 
into community methods in which imagined space is constructed or used as a form of 
resistance in assimilation arguments. In turn, D.C. Chinatown helps to flesh out the 
story of a living, residential Washington not mentioned in popular historie , but does 
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so by picking up on the tradition of writing about architectural Washington as a way 
to view the social and cultural history of the people involved. In this way, D.C. 
Chinatown and the historical literature on Washington, D.C. can present a pa i l turn 
in Chinese American history, as a call for Chinese American and other ethnic studies 
scholars to consider the importance of architecture in the built street capes of Chinese 
communities.  
Studying D.C. Chinatown 
 The focus on architecture and its symbolic uses is particularly apparent in the 
documentary record of D.C. Chinatown. The Chinese community has had a long 
history in Washington, D.C., stemming from its earliest days in the late 1800s, when 
Chinatown consisted of half a dozen buildings on Pennsylvania Avenue between 3rd 
and 4th Streets NW.27 Despite this history, much of the typical primary source 
material for telling the story of a community, such as personal letters, community 
newspapers or other instruments of a community voice is scarce in th case of D.C. 
Chinatown, particularly in the public collections. However, there is an extensive vein 
of material focusing on the physical redevelopment of Chinatown space, starting in 
the early 1970s. The Washington Post historical archive has a voluminous number of 
articles on Chinatown during this period, focusing on the development effor s of the 
Convention Center and sports arena, indicating the significance of thespatial uses of 
Chinatown to the broader Washington society during the 1970s to the 1990s. In order 
to present a fuller and more nuanced picture of D.C. Chinatown during this 
development period I attempted to find more community-based documentary sources 
that I could read these Washington Post newspaper articles against, in order to see if 
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there were discrepancies in the view of the larger society versus the localized ethnic 
community. Trying to locate the multiple voices of the community and their 
experience of Chinatown during this tumultuous era was more difficult. One of the 
only secondary sources on D.C. Chinatown was a community history written by a 
community non-profit group, which contained a crucial timeline and key leads into 
people and players within Chinatown during this time period. The names, dat and 
places listed helped provide a useful context in understanding the primary source 
newspaper articles as well as the Harrison Lee Papers (HLP), a rare and richly 
detailed primary source of the community elite’s role in Chinatown development. 
This collection consists of the papers of Harrison Lee, a longtime resident of 
Washington’s Chinatown. Lee was a retired CIA officer who sat on several key 
committees that governed D.C. Chinatown, such as the Chinatown Steering 
Committee and the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA). His 
papers included the minutes of the Chinatown Steering Committee, corr sp ndence 
between Lee and the D.C. city government regarding their visions f r the 
development of Chinatown and CCBA papers concerning the development of Wah 
Luck House, a low-income housing project in Chinatown. His pivotal roles in 
determining the development direction of Chinatown and the administrative ecords 
and papers that are preserved in his collection helps clarify the choices and 
perspective of the Chinese business and professional elite during this period of 
development. The Harrison Lee Papers combined with The Washington Post historic 
newspaper articles helped to piece together the story of D.C. Chinatown. The 
common emphasis in the written rhetoric and justifications in both these sources upon 
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the uses of architecture in anchoring the visual identity and chara ter of Chinatown 
was very revealing. 
 The structure of this essay will focus on the different epochs during the late 
twentieth century, tracing how the role of architecture in D.C. Chinatown has 
changed and shifted over time to reflect the rhetoric and motivati ns of the 
community. In Chapter 1, we will explore how the architectural streetscape of 
Chinatown of the 1970s was used as a force of community resistance which elicited 
sympathy from the general public that encouraged the city to give up potential 
economic gains and move the Convention Center as well as declare the a a historic 
district. In Chapter 2 we focus on the 1980s, and see a shift from this grassroots-based 
activism against large-scale urban development towards a more planned emphasis on 
the visual streetscape to design and create a culturally nostalgic Chinatown. In 
addition, the loudest voices in the debate have become those of the Chinese business 
elite in their positions on the advisory board to the D.C. government, the Chinatown 
Steering Committee. We will see how the Chinese business and professional elite 
sought to take control of the streetscape, and with the agreement of the D.C. city 
government was able to successfully institute a set of design guidelines that 
encouraged the growth of an increasingly “Chinese” streetscape, with traditional-style 
Chinese lanterns, pavements and buildings. By Chapter 3, we will see how this 
increasing trend towards Orientalization of Chinatown coalesced into the creation of 
the D.C. Archway, which encapsulated the business elite’s vision for Chinatown as a 
global tourist and commercial mecca. This chapter will also explore some of the 
external factors motivating the Chinatown elite’s focus on redevelopment, such as the 
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post-industrial economy and normalization of relations with China and the ouble-
edged sword this international backdrop had on D.C. Chinatown. In Chapter 4, we 
will see how the story of Chinatown development came full circle – the sports center 
that was rejected and successfully resisted in the 1970s was embraced in the 1990s by 
Chinatown residents and businesses alike, reflecting the changing social and 
economic motivations as well as the renegotiated role of architecture in the 









Chapter 1: Saving Chinatown, 1970s 
 
If we take ourselves back to that pair of contrasting images, of quiet, relatively 
residential but poorly maintained D.C. Chinatown of the 1970s and the Technicolor 
commercial of Chinatown of today, how did one morph into the other?  
We could say it all really began on June 8, 1972 when entrepreneur, Abe 
Pollin, announced that his new, professional hockey team and the transplanted 
Baltimore Bullets would play in a stadium built in D.C. if he could be assured, in 
ninety days time, that the stadium would be “ready for play in September 1974.”28  
Thus began a flurry of activity, both within the Rayburn House (D.C. had not yet 
fully instituted home rule, and these were still matters that requi ed congressional 
approval) and on the pages of The Washington Post, where the matter was debated 
hotly by congressmen and community members both for and against the proposed 
development of a 25-acre convention center/sports arena, south of Mount Vernon 
Square and smack in the middle of Chinatown. 
 On the surface and in the initial stages of debate, there appeared to be a clear 
demarcation of who was on the usual sides of the development fence: “Washington’s 
established and powerful business community” arguing for the construction of the 
arena, and on the other, “a vocal coalition of residents, commercial entrepreneurs and 
church-goers.” As The Washington Post so evocatively put it in their headline, it 
appeared to be the age-old fight of “Progress versus People.”29 The Metropolitan 
Washington Board of Trade, along with other organizations such as the Washington 
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Board of Realtors and the D.C. Chamber of Commerce strongly supported the 
building of the convention center, claiming that to do so would help to increase city 
revenue by $112 million, create about three thousand new jobs (twenty-five hundred 
of which are directly related to the construction of the center) and help to decrease 
crime in the area.30 A Washington Post columnist cited similar arguments for the 
advantages that the convention center/sports arena would have for the city’s 
depressed economy: “the plums from a sports arena alone would be many. There is 
no doubt that if the Eisenhower complex becomes a reality, Washington would get 
major-league hockey and basketball franchises. The complex could feature an 
‘Avenue of the Nations’ with all sorts of exotic restaurants.”31 Yet the columnist was 
also conflicted and sympathetic towards the plight of the Chinese community:  
“But to the Chinese Americans in Washington, who could be displaced 
persons, their situation is as pressing as any international 
problem…the proposed convention center-sports arena 
complex…would swallow the heart of Chinatown and perhaps 
eliminate the colorful colony. Once before the colony was uprooted 
when the Federal Triangle was built but the Chinese merchants feel 
that the Eisenhower complex would scatter them for good. It is useless 
to argue with them that the new center would be good for business and 
would revive a blighted area. Not all the money gained after the 
government exercises its eminent domain would compensate for the 
loss of their businesses, according to the involved merchants.”32  
 
Chinatown community members, such as restaurant owner George Moy, owner of the 
Joy Inn at 609 H Street, also began speaking on their own behalf, testifying at a 
public hearing that “I’d like the Chinese community to stay together. The way it looks 
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now, we’re going to be in Southwest, Northwest, all over the city.”33 Similarly, the 
February 1974 issue of Eastern Wind, the self-proclaimed “Washington D.C. Asian 
American community newsletter,” published “An Open Letter to the Asian 
Community,” which urged Chinatown residents to “write letters to the chairmen of 
the House and Senate Appropriations and District Committees….to express your 
opinion on the Center and the need to preserve Chinatown to the Mayor and City 
Council.”34 The letter argued that “making the downtown livable means preserving 
and fostering the present community, and not pushing it out for projects which really 
benefit only a few individuals.” The Eastern Wind group also circulated  petition to 
protest the displacement of the community by the proposed site.35  This sentiment, 
that the spatial integrity and cohesion of Chinatown would be affected by the building 
of the arena, seemed to be an argument that most resonated against the convention 
center/sports arena in public opinion. The Washington Post editorials on the subject 
cite Chinatown frequently:  
“We share the Board of Trade’s enthusiasm for building a convention 
center and sports arena in downtown Washington in time for the 
bicentennial celebrations in 1976. But to build this complex, as 
originally proposed…would further impair rather than restore the 
economic health of the downtown business district. To destroy the 129 
business establishments of Chinatown and furniture row, to say 
nothing of two active churches, is hardly a way to ‘revitalize’ them.”36  
 
In this particular editorial, not only do they place the ‘129 business establishments of 
Chinatown’ at the forefront of their argument, they conclude by stating that, in their 
proposed alternative, of moving the center/arena to the Union Station area, the 
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preserved and “refurbished Chinatown with all its potential charm and bustle,” will be 
added incentive for center-goers to be attracted to shop, eat and linger in the 
downtown D.C. business district. Others, such as Herb Franklin, vice president of the 
housing and urban growth of the National Urban Coalition, noted that “such a 
‘tightening’ of the site [reducing the size of the planned arena] would permit the 
preservation and enhancement of the Chinese owned and operated businesses that 
now appear to contribute to the strength of the vicinity.”37 Rep. James J. Howard (D-
NJ), a member of the subcommittee for the Public Works committee, said that “he 
had been particularly impressed by the presentation of Chinese community embers. 
“As far as I’m concerned all bets (on the arena) are off,” Howard said.”38  
Thus, although the House Public Works Subcommittee had initially 
unanimously approved the proposed 25-acre convention center/arena proposal, the 
lobbying and protest efforts by the Chinese community, in conjunction with the 
African American churches and furniture store owners in the area, w re able to sway 
public sentiment to such an extent that a public hearing in the New Hope Baptist 
Church, located at 816 8th St NW, in the heart of the community, was held, which was 
attended by 300 people and lasted for 6 hours. Testimony was given by Chinese 
community members as well as the African American church goers and furniture 
store entrepreneurs. Their testimony proved convincing. After listening to the 
community’s appeals, Representative Kenneth Gray, head of the House P blic 
Buildings and Grounds Subcommittee, agreed to whittle down the proposed size of 
the arena from 25 acres to 15 acres, and promised that “whatever happens, the heart 
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of Chinatown, two inner-city churches and furniture row would be saved.”39 
Similarly, James O. Gibson, chairman of the city’s bicentennial commission that 
supported the building of the arena in time for the bicentennial celebration in 1976, 
also emphasized that they would continue to be for the construction of the center, but 
with the condition that the Chinese community be preserved.40 
Thus, the most compelling rhetoric used in The Washington Post articles 
against the arena site was often for the preservation of the D.C. Chinese community – 
numerous articles waxed lyrical about Chinatown, likening it to SanFrancisco’s 
Chinatown (“would San Francisco think of razing its historic downtown for the sake 
of a sports arena and parking lots?”), reiterating the Chinese community’s history and 
roots in the Federal Triangle area and printing many residents’ r minisces about the 
Chinese community. Similarly, a cartoon on the back page of the Eastern Wind 
newsletter depicted a drawing of the Eisenhower Center and a giant truck labeled 
‘purple people mover’ looming over a crowd of Chinese, including a woman holding 
a child and a young man standing and shaking his fist at the truck (see Illustration 1). 
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Illustration 1: Eastern Wind Newsletter Cartoon of the Center 
Controversy, 1974 
 
This image of citizen protest, of buildings and machines against women and children, 
evocatively portrays the perception that this was a fight between ‘progress’ and the 
(Chinese) ‘people.’ But who were these people? And could one group really speak for 
an entire community?  
In reality, those opposed and those for the arena were much murkier and complex. 
Some Chinese restaurant owners actually embraced the promise of increased 
economic activity that a downtown arena would bring. Douglas Y. Toy,owner of the 
Kowloon Restaurant, near 11th and H St, just at the edge of the proposed new 
convention center, seemed to harbor no sentiment about the potential demiseof the 
historic buildings in the area: “an old town, an old city, must be improved, renewed. 
You can’t keep the 19th century, you can’t keep the houses rotting. You have to build 
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and go forward, not look back. It will be good for everybody.”41  In addition, none of 
the traditional Chinatown leadership, such as the Chinese Consolidated Ben volent 
Association (CCBA), the umbrella organization for family, merchant and fraternal 
associations in the Chinese community, the president of which is usually considered 
the unofficial mayor of Chinatown, were quoted in any of the articles discussing the 
Convention center/arena controversy in 1972-1973, as the voice for the community. 
Instead, it was the Chinese Community church that took the lead in the fight to save 
Chinatown. The CCBA’s mysterious silence in the public controversy overthe 
building of the center/arena is curious given their normal role as the “official” voice 
and representative of the Chinese community to society at large, not just in D.C. 
Chinatown but in Chinese American communities throughout the United States. 
Although their representative leadership might be disputed, as we see later in Chapter 
2, their historic role in the Chinese American community makes them a recognizable 
voice, both within Chinatown and the larger mainstream society. Their sil nce in 
some activities and efforts in others, thus speak volumes for whatthe CCBA 
members, these community leaders in clan associations and Chinatown businesses, 
felt was important for the Chinatown community.   
The Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association (CCBA) is a Chinese 
American institution with an extended history and significance, reaching far beyond 
the boundaries of D.C. Chinatown and having roots in San Francisco and chapters in 
most major Chinese American communities from their beginnings in the 1800s. 
Formed in 1850 originally as the Chinese Six Companies, so named after the six 
                                                




original associations, it was instituted to serve as a board of arbitration with overall 
jurisdiction within the community, to mediate feuds between the plethora of clan and 
district associations.42 Renamed the CCBA in 1880 as the organization began 
lobbying more intensely against anti-Chinese legislation, the CCBA in San Francisco 
became known for its public works within the community, such as the building of 
schools and hospitals, not just for business mediation. This growing responsibility 
and programming within the larger Chinese community made it known in the outside 
world as the official representative of the Chinese community.43   
This historic business-orientation and mercantile interests might explain their 
silence in the terms of the Convention Center proposal, possibly suggestin  that the 
CCBA members were conflicted about how the proposed center/arena could
potentially economically benefit Chinatown, as Douglas Toy, quoted above, felt? 
This seems possible, given the later efforts on the part of the CCBA to encourage 
hotel and other commercial development in the area. Although further res arch is 
required to find out the specific motivations and opinions that the CCBA had 
regarding the Convention center/arena plan, their very silence in th  public channels 
of debate could represent differing, but silent, opinions within the Chinatow  
community.   
A Home in D.C. Chinatown?  
Despite this curious silence, the CCBA’s demonstrated emphasis on public works 
indicates their continued prominence in the development decisions of Chinatown in 
the 1970s.  The CCBA took strong and effective action when it came to the 
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development of Wah Luck House (House of Happiness), a low-rent apartment 
complex that the CCBA built in conjunction with the National Housing Partnership in 
1982. In September 1978, the CCBA had applied to the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development to acquire the vacant lot located at the corner of 6th and H 
Street, in the heart of D.C. Chinatown, to build an apartment complex for the 
Chinatown residents that were being displaced by the building of the Convention 
Center, scheduled to be completed in 1982.44 Permission was granted, and 
groundbreaking began on May 9, 1981. The business-orientation of the CCBA is 
evident in the way the CCBA created the Chinatown Development Co. to own the $8 
million property, which was then leased and operated by the National Housing 
Partnership, a federally chartered, private organization that helped community groups 
with rental housing and housing projects.45  
Yet, the Wah Luck House, despite its Chinese-style apartment balconies, moon-
door entrances and graceful red script trickling down one long wall, msks the more 
complex reality of D.C. Chinatown’s changing demographic patterns and the fact that 
many of the Chinese who run its restaurants, associations and gift shops, no longer 
live in the District but out in the Maryland and Virginia suburbs. In the 1970 census, 
there was a recorded 7354 persons of Chinese birth or with one or two Chinese-born 
parents living in the Washington metropolitan area, of which only 2,099 of them 
actually lived in the District of Columbia; 3982 lived in suburban Maryland and 1273 
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lived in suburban Virginia.46  Some, possibly the majority of the total Chinese 
population in the greater D.C. area, moved to D.C. from other parts of the United 
States and did not feel any compulsion to live in the downtown Chinatown: “Yim [a 
Chinese American originally from Hawaii who moved to D.C. in the 1950s and lives 
in Glen Echo, Maryland] said his family never thought once about living in 
Chinatown. He said he feels very assimilated, more so, he assumes, than he might be 
if he lived in New York or San Francisco.”47  May Zung, who was a volunteer at the 
Chinese Cultural and Education Center at the Federal City College in Chinatown, 
noted: “my own feeling is that the immigrants are better off if they move out of here 
as fast as possible. If they continue living here, they’ll never learn to speak English. 
They don’t make progress if they stay down here.”48 If the majority of Chinese do not 
live in downtown Chinatown, and they feel no historic ties or even that there ar  
socioeconomic detriments to living an ethnic enclave, why did the CCBA push to 
develop the Wah Luck House and later, to develop and preserve Chinatown? Their 
reasons and motivation perhaps stem from the sociopolitical context of the 1970s. 
This post-civil rights era marked the growing ethnic pride and cultural development 
of Chinatowns across the United States. The views expressed by Yim and Zung were 
not entirely true of many Chinese who felt strong family or historic ties to downtown 
Chinatown, despite not living there. Medsger in her article, also describ  the Chinese 
teenagers, of families who used to live in downtown Chinatown and had moved to the 
suburbs, who continued to travel down to Chinatown regularly on Sunday afternoons 
                                                






and Wednesday evenings to play volleyball in the parking lot at 6th and H Streets 
NW. Wesley Chin, a University of Maryland graduate was quoted saying: “He would 
like to move to a different neighborhood, but he would always want to come back 
downtown occasionally to be with other Chinese people. Although he has other 
aspirations for himself he did not want to see the family’s Chinese grocery store leave 
Chinatown. If one of his brothers does not choose to stick with the business, “maybe 
our wives can run it.””49 The subsequent generations of Washington-area Chinese, it 
seems, no longer wanted to live in downtown Chinatown, but wanted to preserve 
Chinatown, for the memories and the cultural connections they felt from being with 
other Chinese. Jean Lee, whose family moved to D.C. Chinatown in 1949 from Hong 
Kong and set up shop at 608 H Street, translated for a Washington Post reporter as 
her father reminisced about how people used to dress up on Sundays and flock to
Chinatown, to go to the Chinese community church, visit relatives and the din  at 
one of the Chinese restaurants in the area.50 Jean’s brother, William Chin, described 
how “Chinatown in those days was like Georgetown…at 2 or 3 in the morning, 
people walking in the streets going to restaurants.”51 Tom Lee, manager of Chinatown 
Tropicals fish store in Chinatown in the 1980s and frequent visitor to downtown 
Chinatown, also had fond memories of Chinatown: “ I remember how the old Chinese 
used to sit out on the stairs…they would read their Chinese newspaper  and play 
mah-jongg with ivory tiles and Chinese characters written on them.”52 This all 
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changed, in the 1960s. The race riots that rocked Washington D.C. also m de their 
mark on downtown Chinatown. Although no Chinese restaurants or stores wer  
actually looted or destroyed in the riots, the proximity of the danger scared people 
away from downtown. Chinese residents moved away, or were forced to when
business declined.53 By the late 1970s, all that remained were the elderly Chinese 
who were reluctant to leave the area, or the new immigrants who could not afford to 
move out to the suburbs or who wished to stay close to an area with Chinese-
language support. Businesses had also declined, leaving only about 10 restaurant  nd 
businesses and since only 25% of these were actually owned by Chinese, the chances 
of this dwindling even more was very real.54 Yet, as we have seen in the fond 
descriptions above, the suburban Chinese who moved away still retained strong 
nostalgic ties to downtown Chinatown and to the sense of history it represented for 
the community. The Chinese Community Church, located at 10th and L Street, drew 
most of its funding and volunteer help from its 300 suburban Chinese members, who 
drove downtown every Sunday to attend services or to volunteer with English classes 
for new immigrants. Jack and Evelyn Lee continued to attend services downtown 
even after moving to Hyattsville in Maryland: “We are so used to going down there. I 
was baptized there. We’re so used to going to the church. We just don’t feel like 
going anywhere else.”55 If the Chinese Community Church represented living ties to 
the downtown community, the Chinatown Mural project represented the symbolic ties 
that the suburban Chinese community had towards Chinatown as well as the 
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increasing awareness of Chinatown to the mainstream public. In 1975, the D.C. 
Bicentennial Commission, the CCBA and Eastern Wind, a group of Asian merican 
college students, came together to work on a large, 32 feet by 24 feet mural called 
“The Chinese in America: Past, Present and Future,” which was painted by the 
Eastern Wind group and depicted images of the history of the Chinese in America. 
The mural was completed and hung on the wall of the Jade Palace Restaurant, in the 
heart of downtown Chinatown, at 8th and H Street,56 proclaiming to all who walked 
its streets the symbolic ownership the Chinese community felt over this particular 
urban space.  
Thus in the face of dwindling demographics but simultaneous increase in this 
sense of ethnic history-making, the CCBA saw the construction of Wah Luck House 
as a chance both to ease the woes of the elderly and poor currently in Chinatown in 
the most explicit sense, but also in a perhaps more implicit and subconscious fashion, 
to try and retain some of the residential aspect of downtown Chinatow . To the 
CCBA and other suburban Chinese, an apartment complex owned by the CCBA, the 
representative of the Chinese community and housing Chinese elderly, is a tangible, 
living symbol to the community, as a means to preserve an anchor of their historic 
presence in downtown D.C. Wah Luck House, despite its modest rents and quiet, 
struggling occupants, seem to carry on its back the weight of history, memory and 
cultural heritage – literally as well as figuratively – of the Chinese community’s 
historical and continuing imprint on the physical and visual streetscape of downtown 
D.C. 
 
                                                




Given this sense of nostalgia and yearning for a living downtown Chinatow , 
it is interesting to note the Chinese community’s lack of involvement and occasional 
opposition to the movement to preserve the 7th Street corridor and turn it into an 
official downtown Historic District. This happened in 1976; right after the victorious 
coalition of Chinese community members, church goers and store owners ere able 
to push the Convention Center and scale it down to preserve their small collection of 
historic worship places, stores and residences. A citizen activist group called ‘Don’t 
Tear It Down’ had begun to agitate for historic preservation of D.C. landmarks in the 
early 1970s. Don’t Tear It Down had successfully lobbied for the preservation of 
several D.C. historic buildings, such as the Old Post Office Building and the Willard 
Hotel, making it “socially acceptable” in D.C. public opinion to be concer ed about 
historic preservation.57 In 1976, in a proposal to save the buildings facing G, H, I, 5th, 
6th, 7th and 8th Street NW and in the area where they intersect,58 Don’t Tear It Down 
had sent a letter to Harrison Lee, then chairman of the CCBA asking if the CCBA 
would like to be involved in a survey of the area for their application to the Joint 
Committee of Landmarks of the National Capital.59  
There was no record of a reply in Harrison Lee’s files, but a smll detail 
recorded in a later Washington Post article speaks volumes of the disapproval that the 
Chinese community, as represented by the CCBA, felt about the plan towards 
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creating the Historic District. In 1982, after the Historic District application had been 
submitted, Harrison Lee, then vice-chairman of the CCBA attended th  public 
hearings for the D.C. Joint Committee on Landmarks and was quoted as oppo ing the 
historic district, saying that “his community wants to invest in ‘new, contemporary 
Chinese-style buildings’ in the area centering on 7th and H Street.60 This remark is 
significant in the way it helps us understand the more nuanced vision that the Chinese 
community had about ‘saving’ Chinatown. It was not merely to save the 19th century 
structures of rowhouses in which they had lived or worked in since the 1930s. Rather, 
the residents and business owners saw that to save Chinatown was to bring in 
economic development and other means of maintaining a living neighborhood, rather 
than a historic façade. Further evidence of this view can be seen in the fact that the 
city had hired Edward Park, a Baltimore architect, to consult with the Redevelopment 
Land Agency to conduct a $200,000 study into what the Chinese community wa ed 
to do to “preserve and beautify” Chinatown. For the Chinese community of 
businessmen and other residents, the study found that a “Chinese Trade and 
Community Center” was the most favored, along with a square featuring stores, 
exhibition hotels, space for importers and exporters to display their wares, hotels, 
offices, theaters for Chinese opera and acrobatics, a Chinese lbrary, a medical clinic, 
a nursing home, a Chinese temple for tourists, a vocational training center as well as 
housing.61 For the Chinatown residents and business owners, rejuvenation and 
preservation of Chinatown was about creating economic opportunities and bringing in 
amenities and services for a residential neighborhood. 
                                                
60 “Community Groups Fight Historic District,” The Washington Post, March 17, 1982.  
61 William H. Jones, “Chinatown Rejuvenation,” The The Washington Post, February 25, 1973. 
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Despite the lack of a response from the CCBA, Don’t Tear It Down included a 
flattering description of the Chinese community’s history in the 7th Street area, and 
their development and architectural efforts in their application:  
“As an anchor for the new Chinatown, the On Leong Tong 
immediately renovated the buildings it purchased at 618-620 H 
Street, remodeling two buildings into one, adding a pent tile roof 
over the first floor, a balcony at the second level, and a tile roof 
above the third floor. Similar Chinese-ization of existing buildings 
has occurred throughout Chinatown, giving the area a distinctive 
appearance and character.”62  
 
The 7th Street Historic District was officially approved and designated in 
1984, as “historically important to the commercial life of the city before World War 
II,” 63 and included the area along the 7th Street corridor between Mount Vernon 
Square and Pennsylvania Avenue, the F Street corridor between 11th and 7th Streets 
and the Chinatown area along H and I streets between 8th a d 4th Streets. Developers 
and business owners in the 7th Street area had voiced opposition to the boundaries of 
the district since this would necessarily curtail or limit their plans for modern 
commercial development in the area. But to the historic preservationists: 
 “these buildings [would help to] maintain the appearance and scale 
of an earlier era – a kind of main street shopping district of small, 
individually interesting stores and offices. Not only do these 
buildings illustrate the developmental history of the downtown area, 
but they provide amenities of scale and architectural variety which 
should be preserved in the midst of large-scale twentieth century 
development, and which should form the basis for design of this new 
development.”64 
 
Thus, the development debates of 1970s and into the early 1980s represented 
a tussle between differing conceptions of what successful development could be – 
                                                
62 Don’t Tear It Down, Application for Historic District, 6.  
63 The Washington Post, “D.C. Historic Districts,” October 21, 1985. 
64 Don’t Tear It Down, 17. 
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modern and efficient or through a form of cultural nostalgia, a lot of which centered 
on the preservation of D.C.’s seemingly most commercially visible ethnic 
community. These debates proved a tumultuous yet invigorating epoch in the life of 
the city as well as the Chinese community. The first and succe sful efforts of the 
neighborhood coalition, to simply save existing Chinatown from the specter of a 
convention center/arena which would have completely demolished it, raised 
awareness of the history of Washington’s tiny Chinatown in the minds of the larger 
D.C. community. The political and social climate of the time, where r porters were 
doing large feature stories on the city’s ‘hidden ethnics’, meant that the prospect of 
Washington, D.C. having a historic Chinatown similar to that of San Frcisco and 
New York, was an exciting one both for extending and expanding the city’s h dden 
cultural complexity and history and, as we shall observe in more detail in the later 
chapters, for the prospect of these cultural areas to bring in toursts to the city. For the 
Chinese community, it generated similar consciousness of their own history. The 
younger suburban Chinese felt a sense of belonging and community with the 
existence of a downtown Chinatown that had been there since the 1930s and in the 
Washington area since the late 1800s. The suburban Chinese rallying towards saving 
Chinatown through the Convention Center petition, the Wah Luck House and mural, 
represented the deep-seated symbolic and nostalgic bonds that the thought of a 
preserved downtown Chinatown could generate. However, the divergence of opini n 
in the case of the historic district represented the conflicting ideas of Chinatown 
salvation: one version which saw Chinatown as a source of historic nostalgia in 
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contrast to the vision of the Chinatown residents, who saw it as a living 
neighborhood.  
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Chapter 2: Designing Chinatown, late 1980s 
 
The spirit of the times, in the post-civil rights era of burgeoning ethnic pride, 
prompted the Chinese community and in particular, its business and professional 
elite, to push for even greater steps towards creating a Chinatow  that they believed 
represented the vitality of the community. But this vitality, represented in the 1970s 
by the preservation of small business, apartments for the Chinese elderly and historic 
rowhouses, changed dramatically in the 1980s. Unlike Chinatowns in other parts of 
the United States such as San Francisco and New York, and in contrast to its earlier 
efforts, the banner of Chinatown was no longer taken up by community activists or 
non-profit organizations located in the community. The group of young community 
activists who formed Eastern Wind and its attendant newsletter seems to have 
dissolved by the 1980s. Instead, there seems to have been a shift offocus in the non-
profit community towards developing the arts scene. In 1985, the newsletter 
AAMPLITUDE, “bringing you news, views and items of interest – both serious and 
light-hearted – in the arts and media world,”65 was started by the Asian American 
Arts and Media Inc (AAM), which also began the first Washington, D.C. Annual 
Asian American Film Festival in 1982. AAM’s efforts in documenting and promoting 
the arts scene, through its successful film festival and its newsletter which ran until 
1997, did not regularly mention the downtown Chinatown development process.   
Whether this shift in interest was due to changing personal inclinations or a 
more complex blend of factors, such as political differences or the genuine lack of 
                                                




interest in downtown Chinatown for nonprofit organizations, is hard to determin  
from the front face of the written records. Either way, it leftthe space clear for the 
business elite, who ran restaurants and other businesses in Chinatown to have the 
dominant voice in controlling Chinatown’s physical development. These business 
owners had mercantile connections in Chinatown but did not always reside in 
downtown Chinatown. This lack of a residential motivation might have influenced the 
business elite’s conception of Chinatown success. Instead of a historic and 
demographic nostalgia, Chinatown vitality was believed to come in the form of ethnic 
tourism, creating a cultural streetscape that would enhance Chinatown s a tourist 
venue for potential visitors, from the suburbs and from the rest of the world.  
Who Speaks for Chinatown? 
The 1980s also saw the reins of Chinatown shift from traditional leadership, 
such as the CCBA and the established fraternal organization, the On Leong 
Association, to the Chinatown Steering Committee, a “Chinatown community 
organization, formed at the request of the District government, to advise the District 
government on physical, economic and social impacts in Chinatown.”66 The 
Chinatown Steering Committee represented the convergence of a particular Chinese 
business community and the D.C. government, whose specific plans for economi  
development in the area started to solidify in the 1980s and whose effects on the 
physical landscape of D.C. Chinatown became quickly apparent.  
In 1982, The Chinatown Steering Committee was formed and was established 
to: 
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“serve as a liaison and advisory body of the Washington D.C. 
Chinatown, with public and private sectors which include the federal 
government, government of the District of Columbia, the Washington 
Convention Center and private enterprises; on the improvement and 
enhancement of its image for a more attractive, active and 
economically productive serving the residents and visitors of 
Chinatown…”67  
 
 The Chinatown Steering Committee consisted of vocal members of the local 
Chinese business elite, such as restauranteurs Tony Cheng and William Lee and also 
included Lawrence Locke, president of the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent 
Association (CCBA).68 When it was first formed, the Chinatown Steering Committee  
membership qualifications was listed as having three types of members: individual 
members: “Chinatown residents and owners of real estate or business e terprise 
located in Chinatown”; professional members, which included “Chinese lawyers, 
architects, certified public accountants, builders, real estate brokers, and other 
professionals” who are thus implied to be qualified to “provide valuable contributions 
to the economic development of Chinatown,” and finally organizational members, for 
people in “Chinese American organizations in the Washington Metropolitan area.”69 
Although not obviously stated in the mission statement, we can see through the 
membership qualifications that the Chinatown Steering Committee would end up 
pulling together the voices of the business or professional elite within the local 
Chinese community, not necessarily an entire representative breadth. Although 
‘organizational members’ did include such members as the Reverend of the Chinese 
Community Church, other organizations, such as the CCBA often consisted of other 
                                                
67 HLP, Box 5, Folder 12: Chinatown Steering Committee: Minutes 10/09/1984 
68 HLP, Box 5, Folder 6: Chinatown Steering Committee: Committee membership 05/1984 
69 HLP, Box 5, Folder 2: Chinatown Steering Committee: M eting notice, agenda, membership and 
officer qualifications 07/25/1983 
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businessmen, rather than representing the non-profit or low-income community. 
There is also no scope for individuals who may not be residents but may be heavily 
involved in the arts or culture of the area but are not linked to any physical 
organizations in D.C. Chinatown.  
In addition, the formation of the Chinatown Steering Committee seem to 
ignore the role of pre-existing traditional Chinatown organizations such as the CCBA 
and its historic role as representing Chinatown. If there was not a l t of difference 
between the two, why was there a shift in leadership and what sort of impact did it 
make on the legislation and the community? In addition, there was one other major 
community institution in the case of Washington D.C.’s Chinatown which is not 
mentioned at all in the Chinatown Steering Committee documentation – the On 
Leong Association. In 1931, when the plans for the Federal Triangle area
development meant that the Chinese community which was located there would have 
to move, the On Leong Association led negotiations for both north and south sides of 
H Street NW, between 6th and 7th Streets in order to move the Chinese merchants 
together. Their successful efforts, despite much protest from white business owners 
and residents, was the prime reason that a Chinatown continued to exist in downtown 
D.C.70  
Why did the D.C. government create a whole new committee, as opposed to 
simply turning to the CCBA or the On Leong Association as the community’s 
representative? Although there was no primary source material indicating a specific 
reason, some possible reasons can be inferred. Perhaps, as the official adv sory body 
to the D.C. government, the Chinatown Steering Committee was an attempt to reach 
                                                
70 Wendy Lim, Chinatown, D.C.: A Photographic Journal, 35. 
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out to all community groups, rather than picking just one: the Chinese Community 
Church, the CCBA, the On Leong Association and any others. The CCBA, with its 
extensive history and connections, was perhaps seen as having too many 
responsibilities and ties to the national Chinese American community to be able to 
advise the District government on the specific needs of the local D.C. Chinese 
community. The On Leong Association, was also perhaps not the most appropriate 
organization since they represented solely merchants, and the Chinatown S eering 
Committee, at least in its mission statement and outward trappings of membership, 
attempted to pick a larger breadth of society from within the Chinatown community. 
However, the reality of the Chinatown Steering Committee simply shifted the reins 
from one acronym to the other, with the business-orientation of the CCBA members 
within the Chinatown Steering Committee continuing to be a decisive force.    
Home Rule, the Comprehensive Plan and the Chinatown Steering Committee 
The creation of the Chinatown Steering Committee, with its direct 
connections to the D.C. government, represented the marked difference betwe n the 
1980s and the 1970s, where the power of the D.C. city government had increased 
significantly. In 1974, the Home Rule Act was passed, allowing the District of 
Columbia greater authority over development within the district, land use zoning and 
housing. Under the Home Rule Act, the National Capital Housing Authority (NCHA) 
and the Redevelopment Land Agency (RLA), was transferred completely under the 
Office of the Mayor’s supervision. In contrast to the early 1970s, when for instance, 
the Center/Arena proposal became a lengthy, drawn-out debate as plans had to go 
through congressional offices for approval, matters concerning District development 
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in the 1980s, moved more quickly and efficiently since the D.C. government had 
increasing autonomy to make plans and coordinate more swiftly with the relevant 
housing and land-use agencies.71 Under the mantle of increased self-government, the 
Act ensured the fledgling city government had some overarching concept to guide it. 
As part of the legislation of the 1974 Home Rule Act for D.C. self-government, the 
Act mandated the need for a comprehensive plan: “a general policy document that 
provides overall guidance for future planning and development of the city.”72 Within 
the 1984 Comprehensive Plan, the D.C. government made significant plans for the 
redevelopment of the city, with seven major goals:  
“stabilizing neighborhoods, employment and economic growth, 
creation of a ‘living’ downtown, preserving and promoting cultural 
and natural amenities, respecting and improving the ‘physical 
character of D.C., preserving and ensuring community input, and 
preserving the ‘historic character’ of D.C.”73   
 
These goals, as Lewis, a contributing writer to The Washington Post and an 
architecture professor at the University of Maryland noted, were ha d to argue with. 
However, the Plan’s focus on the Downtown Element, which was defined as the rea 
between the Capitol and North Capitol, Massachusetts Avenue, 15th Street and 
Pennsylvania Avenue, Lewis found a bit more controversial. The Plan highlig ted the 
Gallery Place and Chinatown area as the center of downtown, where t  
redevelopment would focus. Although the Plan promoted housing and residential 
development in other parts of the city and even in the downtown area, its focus for the 
Chinatown area was slightly different: the Plan instead encouraged retail development 
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on H Street, to “allow eastward extension of Chinatown retail uses.”74 The Plan also 
frequently used the term, “design”; whether it was to “develop design guidelines for 
development surrounding the [Judiciary] square,” or to “improve the design or use of 
open space,” or “support redesign of the park reservation at 5th Street and 
Massachusetts Ave with a Chinese landscape theme.”75  Lewis perceived that “these 
objectives [focused] on much more than land use, [these objectives] are conc rned 
with the form of the streetscape, architectural motifs, landscaping, traffic, parking, 
and implicit economic issues.” The Comprehensive Plan was a strong indicator of the 
D.C. government’s interest and ability to utilize the increased governmental authority 
that the Home Rule Act has provided. Instead of, as Lewis implied, simply 
designating land use zones and leaving urban development to grow organically within 
these land use zones, the D.C. government, with its new mandate, hoped to be able to 
have a stronger hand in actually crafting what that growth looked li , as their 
emphasis on architectural motifs and streetscapes seemed to indicate. Although Lewis 
remarked at the end of his column that the obstructive regulations might ean that a 
lot of the Plan will be ‘wishful thinking,’ we know that many of these goals, such as 
the heightened streetscape design and instituting of Chinese design themes, were 
indeed put into place by the end of the 1980s.  
The Plan referred specifically to Chinatown as “D.C.’s only ethnic cultural 
area’ and thus, required special treatment as a potential regional tourist attraction.76 
This is particularly unusual, given the rich African American history of places such as 
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75 Ibid. 
76 HLP Box 1, Folder 13: Objectives and Policies Relating to Chinatown 01/31/1984 
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the Shaw neighborhood and Adams Morgan which were not given this ‘special 
treatment.’ In addition, in March 1985, the D.C. city government further solidified 
this conceptualization when they amended the D.C. Comprehensive Plan Act with 
D.C. Law 5-187, which designated Chinatown as a ‘special treatment ar a’ and 
requested that ‘design standards [be instituted] that enhance the Chinese character of 
the area.”  
This highlighting of Chinatown in the planning documents for D.C. added to 
the larger global trend in the Anglophone world towards preserving and redeveloping 
Chinatowns for both political and economic gain. As we saw in earlier scholars’ work 
on Chinatowns in Portland, Vancouver, Victoria and Sydney in the 1980s, other cities 
involved the municipal government as well as the local Chinese business community 
who sought to capitalize on the economic potential of a historic and touristy 
Chinatown. But were the collaborative efforts between the government and the local 
community as closely knit in other cities as it was in D.C.? Unlike the Neighborhood 
Advisory Councils, whose members were elected based on a majority of voters in the 
neighborhood,77 the Chinatown Steering Committee had no additional jurisdiction 
and was formed, “at the request of the District government” in order to p ovide that 
“community input” that helped the formulation of the D.C. government’s  
Comprehensive Plan.  
Given the business and professional orientation of the members of the 
Chinatown Steering Committee, it is not surprising then, that the Comprehensive Plan 
would place such emphasis on the retail expansion of Chinatown and the overall
Chinese design of the streetscape. In addition, perhaps most revealing, is the fact that 
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Alfred Liu, the eventual architect of the D.C. Archway, and the Pr sident of the 
Architect and Engineers’ Planning Association (AEPA), who published the 
Chinatown Urban Design Study, was an active member of the Chinatown Steering 
Committee (the minutes for July 25th 1983 were typed with his letterhead at AEPA 
and he was the member to forward the motion for procedures and policies to be 
adopted regarding membership), invited to serve as its technical advisor. A coherent 
architectural theme would be more compelling to restauranteurs and businesses 
selling Chinese goods and services, than it would be to a low-income resident living 
in Chinatown who would have possibly preferred more amenities and services, as 
opposed to street lamps with a Chinese motif.  
Chinatown Design Guidelines, 1988  
Yet, the mission and goals of the Chinatown Steering Committee did not state 
explicitly that its goals were to influence the physical look of Chinatown simply that 
their role was to:  
“identify issues concerning and in/or confronting Chinatown; to serve 
as an advocate for the best interest of Chinatown; to communicate the 
views of its members and community to decision-makers; to collect 
and disseminate information concerning the present and future 
activities and the developments which will have an impact on 
Chinatown; to serve as a catalyst to promote the betterment and 
development of Chinatown.”78  
 
Thus, the business-orientation of Chinatown Steering Committee membership 
and the appointment of an architect as a technical advisor revealed the D.C. city 
government intention of, and the Chinatown Steering Committee’s positive response 
to, the use of visible, architectural concepts as the means to imprve Washington 
D.C.’s Chinatown. These architectural guidelines for the image of Chinatown that the 
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local business community, endorsed by the D.C. city government, wanted to create, 
went beyond general guidelines. They wanted to create a whole experience. The 
touristy, revenue-generating impulse that informed the D.C. city government, the 
Chinatown Steering Committee and in turn, the AEPA publishers, can be seen in their 
statement: “People drive up to eight hours to go to the ‘Old Country’ a  Busch 
Gardens. Why not develop Washington’s only official ethnic area and make it a 
world-class wonder that attracts people downtown?”79  
To make it a ‘world-class wonder’, the Study had building design ta dards 
for organizations that wished to build within Chinatown, with criteria ranging from 
‘overall East-West integration’ to the types of paint colors theyshould and should not 
use, “so as not to insult Chinese tradition” with inappropriate colors and color 
placement. Beyond individual permit applications, the Study also describ  
recommendations for designing the public space of Chinatown – from incorporating 
Chinese zodiac signs into the sidewalk pavements (see Illustration 2) and making this 
paving pattern “incorporated into the official Streetscape Code and enforced by the 
D.C. Streetscape Committee,” to the suggestion of using traffic signal  of a Chinese 
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Given the close connections between AEPA and the Chinatown Steering Committee, 
AEPA seemed relatively confident in proposing many architectural design ideas to 
enhance the ‘branding’ they hoped to create for Chinatown, D.C.. Many of the design 
elements that the Study proposes, are described in these tones of commercial culture 
and mass media – “they should be ‘world-class attractions’ that capture the interest 
and imagination of everyone, not least the media.” The zodiac signs to be placed in 
the pavements would attract “people [who] will come not just to see Chinatown, but 
also to find out something about themselves. What sign were they born in? What does 
it mean? Of course, the special sidewalks will attract upbeat m dia coverage.” These 
tourists and potential investors, in line with the D.C. city government’s wish to create 
an ‘international’ city, would come from other parts of the world: “As an architectural 
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showplace, Chinatown will create pride for D.C. and will generate such publicity…it 
will also help position D.C. to attract welcome interest and capital from Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and the rest of Asia.”  
In addition, AEPA’s image of a successful (i.e. tourist-generating) Chinatown 
was to sell this exotic difference within safe confines. AEP claims that “careful 
streetscape design will ensure the kind of pleasing order and uniformity of theme 
needed to create the clean, safe, attractive environment that Chinatown must 
provide.” Even as the Study encourages applicants to make sure their design enhances 
the image of Chinatown as a nightlife destination, and a place to play (“Why stay in 
the suburbs when there will be so much to do in Chinatown and the rest of 
Downtown?”), it reiterates that ‘Chinatown will be a family place” and that even at 
night, it will be a place to go that is “colorful, safe and different.”  
By 1991, these guidelines were established as the “Chinatown Design Review 
Procedures” as described in the District of Columbia Federal Register, which made 
effective the ruling that construction, renovations and other projects in Chinatown 
would have to submit a Chinatown Design Review application along with their permit 
application, to the D.C. government’s Office of Planning.80 Although how much these 
guidelines were actually enforced is still debatable, the succe sful recognition at least 
officially, of these regulations is a crucial indicator of the partnership between the 
local Chinatown business community and their efforts to influence the D.C. Office of 
Planning. The Chinatown Design Guidelines Study was thus a successful project 
partnership between the municipal authority and the local business elite, who were 
                                                




united in their desire to redevelop Chinatown into what they saw as amore 
commercially viable site for attracting people, capital and revenue from the outer 
suburbs as well as from foreign investors and visitors.   
 The question then becomes how representative of the business elites’ vision 
for Chinatown? What did others in the non-profit community or residents in 
Chinatown or even in the suburbs feel about this push towards heavily planned 
Chinatown design? Perhaps, they are not as far off as we think. In a summer 
enrichment program run by the Chinese Community Church in 1990, several Chinese 
American children commented on their wishes for D.C. Chinatown:  
“I want Chinatown to look more special. I hope it’s a special street 
for Chinese people. I think they should build more restaurants that 
look like old custom houses. Make Chinatown look more interesting 
than any other street in D.C. that has a custom. Because that is e 
best way to show people and their customs.”81  
 
“I lived in Chinatown all my life…if I can change Chinatown, first I 
would tear down the old buildings and build new ones in old-fashion 
styles, something like in China. The new buildings or houses can sell 
more books, clothes and shoes. They should also have a Chinese 
school teaching more about China. We should tear down some of the 
restaurants of the old, slow business restaurants ( I mean this is 
Chinatown, not foodtown)…and I hope it would come true.”82 
 
Their expressed comments are an uncanny mirror of the motivations behind 
the Chinatown Steering Committee and their Chinatown Urban Design Guidelines 
Study. The way forward for Chinatown is to recreate the old, but with something 
newer and better, as the ‘best way to show people and their customs.’ It is through 
economic development, with new houses in old-fashioned styles, and getting rid of 
older restaurants that do not conform to the new and glitzy streetscap  design 
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82 Christine Jane Lam, quoted in Wendy Lim, Chinatown, D.C.: A Photographic Journal, 74.  
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guidelines, since it would bring down the heightened image of the new Chinatown. 
Although only a few comments were selected for inclusion in the book by the 
community group, Asian American Arts and Media, the fact that these were chosen as 
the ones to highlight is an implicit nod to the comments expressed, a  representative 
of the community. The business orientation of the Chinatown Steering Committee 
thus reflects the demographic reality of D.C. Chinatown, that more and more Chinese 
Americans have a sense of commercial ownership in D.C. as opposed to a residential 
one. An understanding of this skewed demographic gives an added nuance to the 
Chinatown Design Guidelines; there is an implicit desire to attract not just white 
tourists, but the Chinese American community who has moved out to the suburbs. In 
their quote, that “people drive up to eight hours to go to the ‘Old Country’ at Busch 
Gardens, Why not develop Washington’s only official ethnic area and make it a 
world-class wonder that attracts people downtown?”83 There is an implicit paralleling 
of white tourists who would go to Busch Gardens to see examples of their colonial 
heritage, with suburban Chinese Americans, who would be interested in com g back 
to downtown, to see their own roots represented in the commercial city where their 
ancestors, or at least, Chinese Americans of a past generation, lived and worke .  
The ‘living’ downtown, that goal laid out in the Comprehensive Plan of 1984, 
for the Chinatown community, is thus represented by streets of tourists and suburban 
Chinese reliving a cultural history.  
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Chapter 3: Globalizing Chinatown: Building the Friendship 
Arch, 1986 
 
The specific decisions and tensions that the Chinatown Steering Committee and 
the D.C. government made in drafting the Chinatown Design Guidelines refl cted on 
the one hand, the shifting strands of motivation within D.C. and the Chinese 
community. However these specific, ground-level changes also reflected larger shifts 
in the international backdrop of geopolitics and economics – the rise of China as a 
political and economic power, the changing nature of the way cities do business – all 
of which underlay these motivations to build the Archways in the way the  did in the 
1980s. The symbolic means in which these forces took shape in the form of 
Archways was also not unique to D.C. but transnational; strikingly similar projects 
and rhetoric taking place in many Chinese diaspora communities throughout the 
world.   
The International Backdrop  
In the 1970s, cities in the developed world such as the United States and Europe 
were experiencing population decline and lowered economic activity, but by the mid-
1980s, cities were beginning to revive again, as Saskia Sassen notes, due to changes 
in the world economy towards a shift to services rather than industrial production, 
particularly in finance and specialized services, as well as growing 
transnationalization of economic activity.84  Similarly, John Friedmann writes in 1986 
that there has been a rise of world cities as major nuclei for the international division 
                                                




of labor.85 This perception of cities needing to plug into the global economy clearly 
permeated the mindsets of the Chinatown elite as well as D.C. government during this 
timer period.  
Despite this, Washington, D.C. was not one of the cities that saw hat immediate 
revival. D.C.’s unemployment rate was around 9% in the 1970s and hit a high of 
11.4% in early 1983.86 The need for an infusion of economic stimuli to the economy 
and providing a source for continual revenue for the worn-out city was thus an urgent 
one. The D.C. government saw the national trend towards the shift to services and an 
increasingly global economy as a clarion call for the city to promote foreign 
investment in their city, in order to attract population and revenue back to the 
deteriorating downtown. In that vein, D.C. Mayor Marion Barry’s trip o China, was 
organized in order to “market the city of Washington, D.C. as a place to do 
business.”87 In a prime example of the increasing transnationalization of economic 
activity, the trip reported a possible deal with Chinese entrepren u s to set up a 
furniture assembly plant which would hire and train enough low-skilled, unemployed 
residents to lower the city’s high unemployment rate.88  
Just as the increasingly globalized environment prompted Mayor Barry to 
make these overtures to China, the transnational forces also created the backdrop that 
caused the tension within the local community over the Archway. The growing 
international political economy as evidenced in the open-door, modernizatio  policies 
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and the U.S. recognition of China in 1978 led to an influx of Fujian migrants into the 
local Chinese American community, who set up clan associations, or joined existing 
Chinese American organizations but bringing with them a more pro-Beijing stance 
than the previous generation of Chinese Americans, who were predominantly from 
Guangdong Province (and often had sympathetic ties to Taiwan). The factionalism 
between traditional associations often spilled over into contemporary ganizations, 
which as other Chinatown scholars have also pointed out, “somewhat contradicts the 
manifest façade of solidarity so visibly displayed in public collective action.”89  
The policy climate of seeing Chinatown in the light of a cultural tourism 
hotspot, was thus influenced by this backdrop of growing internationalization and, 
with the institution of the Chinatown Design Guidelines, presents a possible reason 
that the D.C. city government finally looked favorably upon the community’s desire 
to create the Archway, albeit not in a manner pleasing to everyon  within the 
community.  
Why Arches? 
At first glance, the ornate symbolism of an arch, proclaiming the entrance to 
the Chinese community’s physical center, seems relatively benign. Yet this seemingly 
simple structure bears upon its tiled shoulders a varied burden of motivations, beliefs 
and symbolism. The Archway represented both the Chinese community’s growin  
desire to announce and preserve their heritage in landscape, as well as evoke the 
imagery of how their diasporic community can be a literal bridge between China and 
the West, particularly crucial during the 1980s as the West began making overtures to 
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China. But why arches? According to David Lai, one of the main planners of 
Victoria, Canada’s archway which was built in 1984:  
“Before the Second World War, it was customary to erect temporary 
arches to celebrate special events or welcome dignitaries on visits. 
Over 120 celebratory arches were built between 1869 and 1945 in 
various cities throughout British Columbia, including four in Victoria. 
Therefore a permanent Chinese arch in Chinatown would be not only a 
way of preserving and recreating a historic past but also a monument 
to the Chinese heritage in Victoria.”90 
 
Lai is referring to a tradition not just before the Second World War but to a historic 
tradition brought over from China, of creating triumphal arches to commemorate 
events, activities or people, as seen in the way designs for triumphal arches and 
Chinese gates were prevalent in 18th century China.91 Thus, just as we saw in the 
Chinatown Design Guidelines, Chinese community elites often wanted to use 
traditional architectural modes, whether it is through Qing Dynasty style courtyards 
and colors, or through creating triumphal archways, heralding Chinese Americans’ 
community in North America. But Chinese arches seem particularly compelling, as it 
is the first and often largest public marker of Chinese heritage on a city’s landscape: 
“although our perception of Chinatown may be shaped by our knowledge 
of it as a social entity, our perception is also influenced by the act of 
seeing…the way our serial views of Chinatown are linked may cause our 
minds to mold the chaotic images of Chinatown into a perceived coherent 
precinct….the architectural components relate harmoniously to the scal
of people passing through the street: We see a large impressive gateway 
[italics added], then details of its design, then facades of the thre -story 
buildings, then the street, sidewalks, people and vehicles, and finally, they 
alleys and courtyards.”92  
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Thus, although Lai claims that “it is the facades of buildings in Chinatown that 
constitute the most striking visual component of place character,”93 the Archway is 
the first and most prominent symbol of a Chinese community and helps to frame the 
rest of the viewers’ image of Chinatown into a “coherent precinct.” The strength of 
this cultural nostalgia in the form of architectural symbolism can be seen in the 
growing phenomenon of construction of Chinatown archways across North America 
during this period – in Canada, at least six Chinese gates were built during the 1980s, 
in Vancouver, Victoria, Montreal, Winnipeg and Edmonton all having at leasone 
Chinatown arch of their own.94 In the United States, Philadelphia, Boston and San 
Francisco all have arches, of varying sizes, proclaiming the entrances to their historic 
community spaces in downtown. Chinatown archways are thus a unique featre of 
Chinese diaspora communities, particularly in North America and other Westernized 
countries. Archways became popular not just because of their ability to commemorate 
the community’s achievement in surviving the migration process, but also, s a 
marker bridging two cultural communities, China and their host country. I  Victoria, 
the Arch of Harmonious Interest was built to “commemorate the cooperation of the 
Chinese and non-Chinese citizens of the city in the rehabilitation of Chinatown as 
well as the harmony of the city’s multicultural society.”95 In Sydney, Australia, 
architect of Sydney’s Chinatown archway, Henry Tsang describes the aspects of the 
Archway and how it represents that bridging of cultures within the community: 
“gold coins from China, symbolic of investment in Australia rather t an 
the removal of assets that previously took place; sand and pebbles from 
China, symbolic of setting down roots in Australia; and the golden tortoise 
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that represented the good luck and long life that the Chinese community 
would bring to Australia...it will contribute…as the symbol of Australia’s 
multiculturalism and a symbolic centre for the Chinese community.”96 
 
Yet, despite these claims of laying roots in their host communities and wanting to 
celebrate their harmonious, multicultural societies, the construction of the Archways 
also lay claims to competing loyalties and alternative forms of belonging. When the 
Philadelphia Friendship Arch was built by the Philadelphia Chinatown Development 
Corporation in 1984, it was proclaimed as “the first authentic gate built in America by 
artisans from China.”97 This statement hints at the other underlying motivation: of 
strengthening cultural ties to China. Given the earlier rhetoric of becoming Chinese 
communities, in Canada, Australia or the United States, using Chinese American 
labor, as opposed to “artisans from China” would seem to have been more appropriate 
to demonstrate their belonging in their new countries. This emphasis on “artisans 
from China” signals the growing sentiment among Chinese diaspora communities tha  
authentic Chinese identity was increasingly linked to ties with mainland China.  
This seems to be unique to the redevelopment of Chinatowns in the 1980s. In 
1970, San Francisco’s Chinatown, arguably the largest and most historic Chinatown 
in the United States, but its simple structure of green tiles and plain concrete pillars 
pales in comparison to the ornate, gleaming structures built in Philadelphia (and later, 
D.C.) in the 1980s. This purposeful contrast is significant for what it cn tell us about 
the difference between the 1970s and the 1980s – that the importance of ties to China 
and the symbolism of the Chinatown arch becomes much more than quaint ethnic 
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pride, but an indicator of growing nationalism, with a China just beginning to open up 
after the shuttered times of the 1970s.  
Ties to China were not only cultural. This bridging of East and West, symbolized 
through this cultural arch were also used explicitly, in the rhetoric of the 1980s, as 
potential economic tools, where many seemed to believe that building the arch would 
help to generate tourism and attract visitors to downtown Chinatown. As David Lai 
added:  
“The arch would be a symbolic entrance to Chinatown and a special 
attraction. Tourists shopping in the Inner Harbour area would be attracted to 
the north part of the downtown commercial district, thus benefiting not only 
Chinatown but also other parts of the downtown area.”98  
 
Thus the grandeur of the Chinatown Arches built in the 1980s, whether it is 
Philadelphia’s “most authentic” arch, Vancouver’s harmonious one or D.C.’s “widest 
arch”, sought not just to commemorate cultural nostalgia and belonging in the host 
country but also to make explicit connections to a rising China and its attendant 
economic and political implications.  
Foundations of the D.C. Archway 
Given the political and economic nature of Chinatown Arches during the 
1980s, it would be particularly appropriate for Washington, D.C.’s Chinatown, the 
Chinatown in the capital city of the United States, to begin to push for their own 
Archway. In December 1984, the CCBA published a report titled “Chinatown 
Gateway:  A Proposal of Giving D.C. Chinatown An Identity.” In this report, it notes:  
“the existing buildings in Chinatown are mostly three to four-story 
brick structures that were built between 1860 to 1910. With very 
little changes of the exteriors, there is hardly any Chinese flavor in 
the whole Chinatown except the Chinese character names of the 
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stores and restaurants. There was no architectural element physically 
strong enough to present an image and identity of Chinatown until 
1982 when Wah Luck House was erected.”99  
 
However, the report notes regretfully that, although “all the Chinese p ople are very 
proud of the Wah Luck House,” and that it has “elevated Chinatown’s image…we do 
not think that, as an apartment building for the elderly, it is appropriate to serve as the 
symbol of Chinatown… Chinatown needs some streetscape treatments to clearly
define its boundaries and identity so that people who come to Chinatown will have a 
sense of place.”100  It is a sign of the times and as we saw earlier, the busines -
orientation of the leading members of the Chinese community, that an rchitectural 
monument is a greater symbol of a living Chinatown than a housing complex of r al, 
but elderly, Chinese residents, who will not be able to contribute actively to the city’s 
economy. The CCBA proposal included a design for two gateways, to define the East 
and West boundaries of H Street as the Chinese Main Street, “where 90 percent of the 
stores and restaurants are concentrated.”101 In addition, the CCBA proposal also 
emphasized that although each gateway was estimated to cost about $310,000, the 
CCBA will be responsible for the project costs, money to be raised in a fundraising 
effort throughout the country. After construction, the CCBA also claims it will take 
responsibility for its maintenance. According to its proposal, “the gat ways will be a 
pure donation from the Chinese people to D.C. Chinatown and the city. We do not
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expect to need any D.C. Government’s financial appropriation, but we do need its 
support of this idea and approval of our design.”102  
There is no mention anywhere in this report, of the furor that had erupted 
within the community and spilled over into the newspaper pages through the latter 
half of 1984. Earlier in the year, in May 1984, D.C. Mayor Marion Barry, on a much-
publicized tour of China, had signed a sister-city accord with the Mayor of Beijing, 
which included an agreement to build an archway along H and 7th Street in 
Washington’s Chinatown district, “a visible symbol of the cultural and economic 
exchanges which will be part of our sister-city agreement and part of my program to 
make the District a visible world-class city.”103 This agreement was greeted with 
mixed emotions from the local Chinese community. It was greeted wi h dismay by an 
older generation of Chinese, particularly those from Taiwan and/or who were 
immigrants who fled China when the communists came into power. This was most 
forcibly and vocally represented by Lawrence Locke, head of the CCBA and 
considered, as the head of the CCBA, the unofficial mayor of Chinatow . Locke was 
quoted in The Washington Post of July 1984 as saying, “We oppose the erection of a 
communist Archway in Chinatown….we have been counting on our own archway for 
more than a year and we don’t want the communist Chinese butting in.”104 Locke’s 
letter to the editor on a later article continued in this vein, although attempting to 
speak for the entire community, refuting the claim that it is purely Taiwanese 
supporters who are against the idea: 
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“the headline [of 2 Chinas] was misleading because one party to the 
dispute over the archway(s) is the Chinese communist government and 
the other party is the Chinese community in Washington, represented 
by the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association and supported by 
other Chinese communities in America. The latter group consists 
mostly of American citizens of Chinese parentage who are not 
necessarily supporters of Taiwan. Therefore, there are not ‘two 
Chinas’ involved in this case but Chinese communists and Chinese 
Americans….the D.C. city government dragged its feet when the 
Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association asked for help in early 
1984 to construct its archway. On the other hand, the D.C. government 
agreed to let the Chinese communists build an archway in Chinatown 
without prior consultation with the local Chinese community. Isn’t it 
ridiculous for the D.C. government to discriminate against its own 
citizens and constituents in favor of a foreign government?... I can 
only wonder why the city government keeps on humiliating the local 
Chinese community.”   
 
However, not made public in his letter to the mainstream media was the support that 
some in the community did feel about the proposed D.C. Archway with Bejing. In an 
anonymous, threatening letter to the Washington China Post a handwritten letter in 
English and Chinese reprimanded the CCBA for refusing the offer of assistance from 
Peking:  
“Today, the Washington China Post, set up by people from Taiwan, and 
the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association set up by some 
Chinese American societies in the District of Columbia both voiced their 
opposition [to the proposed Beijing-sponsored Arch]. Is this not an 
attempt to ‘bury Chinatown in D.C.’? Yet we, a group of Chinese 
Americans, decisively oppose the action and absurd idea of both the 
Washington China Post and the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent 
Association If the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association dared 
to object, their President had better be careful, and be prepared to engage 
several FBI agents for his bodyguards. We, the group of people who 
love Chinatown, are forwarding a warning to the Association. The 
Association will be responsible for all future consequences. Please take 
note. Today, we also want to pose a question: If it were Taiwan who 
offered assistance, then what?”105  
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Their rhetorical question was not wholly unfounded, since Locke had been quoted as 
saying that part of the funds they had raised for their second arch was through 
overseas Chinese communities in Panama, Peru and Jamaica and through fundraising 
pleas throughout the United States against an arch partly financed by the communist 
government in China. However, despite claims by the media that the government did 
not widely consult the local community, Alfred Liu, a member of the Chinatown 
Steering Committee had accompanied Mayor Barry upon his trip to China and was 
later appointed the architect to design the Archway. Liu, in defens of the Arch, 
responded that the archway “does not bear any political statement. It is an 
artwork.”106     
The D.C. Archway proposal thus revealed and exacerbated the tension felt 
between the relatively new Chinatown Steering Committee and the mor  established 
CCBA. Lawence Locke of CCBA claimed that he had only attended two meetings of 
the Steering Committee and has “repeatedly demanded that it be dissolved, saying 
only the Benevolent Association can speak for Chinatown.” John Fondersmith, chief 
of the downtown section of the Office of Planning who helped to establih the 
Chinatown Steering Committee, responded that “the steering committee was formed 
after attempts to work with the association [CCBA] failed. The association “wasn’t 
effective” because “it has a wide range of interests whereas [the steering committee] 
is focused more narrowly on economic planning and development.”107  The CCBA 
had in fact met with and had substantial discussion with the Chinatown Steering 
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Committee, attending their meeting in July 1984 to ask for the Cinatown Steering 
Committee’s support in the privately-funded Arch that the CCBA was hoping to 
construct. According to the minutes of the meeting, “after substantial discussion, it 
was moved by Mr Alfred Liu and Dr James Pao and carried unanimously that the 
Chinatown Steering Committee endorses or supports the construction of archways by 
public and/or private funds providing that they meet a set of approved design 
guidelines and have no political expression or inference.”108 Less than a year later, in 
February 1985 as the Archway controversy continued to mount in the mainstre m 
press, then CCBA president Bosco Lee, again presented CCBA’s case to the 
Chinatown Steering Committee, reiterating the reminder of past repression this Arch 
would represent and that it might adversely affect business in the area. However, the 
Chinatown Steering Committee continued to hold firm in supporting both Arc way 
proposals, particularly when Deputy Mayor McClinton, who was present at the 
meeting, re-emphasized that the city-funded Archway met the design guidelines, that 
the Mayor was committed to the Arch and that they would be happy to consider 
building an additional arch funded by the CCBA.109  
 A seemingly innocuous proposal for a static architectural monument in 
Washington D.C. Chinatown thus resulted in calls of community treason, death 
threats and multiple salacious Washington Post articles – further proof that visual, 
architectural symbols, particularly as they seem to represent particular cultural and 
national ideologies, can be flashpoints and anchors for a community’s identity, no 
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matter how irrelevant they seem to the actual byplay of trade an  living in everyday 
life. Chinatown archways might be, as some critics note:  
“reshaped images of Chinese ethnicity…and a mnemonic for 
Chinatown [as a] unified, sterilized identity for the Chinese 
community reconstructed from an imaginary past…[and that] 
acceptance of this simplistic, reconstructed identity by visitors, 
overlooks the fact that Chinatown failed to represent anything but a 
sterile, pre-digested version of a culture which omitted diversity and 
complexity. It refers neither to China, nor to the Chinese people living 
within a multicultural society, and has become a simulacrum – a copy 
without an original.”110   
 
But what these critics of the archways do not take in account, and as this chapter has 
shown, is how the community itself can be complicit in their own marketing of their 
ethnic identity and image because of the particular international forces that drive the 
need for such large, public symbols of connection to particular cultural communities, 
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Chapter 4: Selling Chinatown, 1990s 
 
Sports Center Chinatown Redux 
The development debates surrounding D.C. Chinatown from the 1970s came 
full circle in twenty years. The sports arena debates that sparked such controversy in 
the 1970s, and led to protests from the Chinese community and their African 
American and furniture store owning neighbors, reared its head again in the 1990s. 
But, this time, the players and the arguments have changed, tellingly and 
significantly. Instead of the progress versus the people debates, the 1980s design 
strategies for Chinatown, the increasingly muscular Chinatown Steering Committee 
and their growing interest in commercial economic development plans, h ve had their 
impact and changed the 1990s debate to one of developers versus other commercial 
developers. Instead of historic preservation of 19th century facades or low-income 
residential units, glitzy proposals are discussed which are best suited to harness the 
area’s economic potential and ability to bring more tourists into the quickly growing 
area. What has changed, as we have seen in the previous chapters, is a g owing sense 
within the Chinese community to rehabilitate Chinatown through large-scal  
economic projects and commercial development with ethnic veneers that can ttract 
street traffic and main stream clientele. The undercurrent of broader shifts in 
redevelopment politics also informed these changing local attitudes and the efforts of 
the D.C. city government and the local Chinese business elite to utilize the tools of 
visual symbols and architectural branding to enhance the image of the city in the 
context of the economic and social times. Sharon Zukin, the cultural critic describes 
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how, in the late twentieth century: “culture is more and more the business of cities – 
the basis of their tourist attractions and their unique competitive edg . The growth of 
cultural consumption (of art, food, fashion, music, tourism) and the industries that 
cater to it fuels the city’s symbolic economy, its visible ability to produce both 
symbols and space.”111 The construction of the D.C. Archway and the attempt to 
regulate a holistic branding experience through the Chinatown Design Standards was 
thus a method of revival via the symbolic economy, which the D.C. government and 
local community had seen attempted in other cities during their time. 
Thus, when Abe Pollin submitted his MCI Center proposal in 1995, for a 
regional entertainment complex that included shops, restaurants, a sports museum, 
pedestrian terraces and a five-level arena for basketball, hockey and for concerts, the 
plan was “blessed by every panel considering it.”112 This plan had fewer opponents, 
since Pollin was planning to use a mostly vacant lot on the 600 block of G Street NW, 
thus not razing any part of existing Chinatown or historic buildings. In addition, in a 
move probably designed to fulfill the Chinatown Design Guidelines, the plan
included a curved, dragon wall style canopy (see Illustration 3) on the sidewalks 
closest to Chinatown, to mimic and blend in with the canopies of nearby Chinese 
restaurants and businesses.113  
                                                
111 Sharon Zukin, The Cultures of Cities (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), 2. 
112 Maryann Haggerty, “Pollins Shows off Plan for Arena that he Insists will be Built,” The 




Illustration 3: Dragon-style Wall Canopy on Verizon Center 
(formerly MCI Center), 2009 
 
Pollin’s new plan also attempted to appease the historic preservationists, with 
red pavers in a basket weave pattern on the sidewalks to evoke Washington’s past, 
and some facades of the building with the same white limestone color to echo the 
federal museums nearby.114 Thus, it is evident that the ensuing outcry that his first 
plan provoked had encouraged Pollin to consider the unique characteristics of he 
neighborhood and to follow the recent developments in the climate of its Chinatown 
residents to propose a plan more appealing to those vocal members of the Chinatown 
Steering Committee who had promoted the Chinatown Design Guidelines. 
There were still critics of the plan, despite Pollin’s attempts. Historic 
preservationists continued to argue that the building will overwhelm everything in its 
vicinity, given its larger size over the smaller, historic buildings in the area.115 In 
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addition, it was also noted that the MCI Center’s focus on sports teams and 
restaurants would have the indirect effect of boosting particular kinds of retail 
development – more specifically that of restaurants and entertainment, as opposed to 
the kinds of retail goods that a residential neighborhood might have desired. A 
Washington Post reporter described how about half a dozen eateries had opened up 
along 7th Street in anticipation of the arena’s opening and quoted developer Douglas 
Jemal, owner of several storefronts, as saying: “restaurants are the future of [urban] 
retail. I’m not saying that it’s going to be that way forever, but right now people don’t 
want to go out and buy a pair of shoes and sunglasses (in the city). They want to go 
out to bars and restaurants.”116 However, as Pyatt, The Washington Post reporter 
noted this implicitly assumed that the people who were going to be walking along 7th 
Street were tourists or visitors from the suburbs, not residents who might have needed 
to pop out of their apartments, houses or condominiums to buy precisely a pair of 
shoes or sunglasses.  
Although Pyatt highlighted the need to consider the welfare of residents living 
in the area, the residents themselves saw things a bit differently – they were less 
concerned about the need to cater to them because there were fewer and fewer 
residents living in the 7th Street area by the mid 1990s. Wah Luck House, the vaunted 
symbol of Chinatown’s anchor in the downtown D.C. area in the early 1980s, hid a 
more cynical outlook on the prospects for Chinatown. A Washington Post reporter, 
writing a feature article on the ‘Last Days of Chinatown,’ and the negative impact of 
the proposed arena, claimed that “no one in the Wah Luck House has dared to admit 
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to the others that they were ready, even eager, to speed along the demis  of their own 
place. It [seemed] somehow disrespectful to the elders, to the courage s immigrants 
who came before them.”117 This attitude, hidden though it might have been, could be 
the reason, that no new residential development was made in the area, nor had it made 
the neighborhood any more attractive to immigrants who “[yearned] to live 
somewhere safer and greener.”118 
Although the residents did acknowledge that the proposed arena would likely 
make the area safer, busier and improve business, the arena would als  push up real 
estate values, possibly raising the rent. But fewer and fewer Chinese n the downtown 
area were worried about apartment rentals; what was more significant to the 
increasingly business-oriented Chinese community left in Chinatown, was how this 
raised the cost of doing business and how they would lose control of the commercial 
development of Chinatown. Alfred Liu, architect of the Archway, key member of the 
Chinatown Steering Committee and the Chinatown Design Guidelines, described the 
impact of what he thought the arena would have on Chinese businesses:  
“This is a sports arena, not a concert hall. Concertgoers might want a 
sit-down dinner after a show, but hockey fans get in their cars and go 
home. What an arena would do is push up real estate values, and this 
would destroy Chinatown by inviting big developers to eat up the 
small flowers. The money you can make from a Chinese restaurant is 
not enough to make you say `No' to a big developer. The owners will 
sell, move to Florida and enjoy the rest of their lives.” 
Yet, the sense of doom of Chinatown’s potential demise did not spark the sam  kind 
of protests as the Center/arena proposal did back in the 1970s. This was partly 
because the 1990s proposal was more sensitive to the needs of its surroundings and 
                                                




because the arena would only take up one block, as opposed the sprawling, 25-acre
proposal back in the 1970s. But the timing was also more propitious. The opposition 
in the 1990s had been reduced to a few eulogistic pieces in The Washington Post, 
decrying the demise of Chinatown rather than calling for outright pro ests or 
alternatives like in the 1970s. The community itself, both its Chinese r sidents and 
the larger D.C. society, was ready to see what a brash, glitzy arena, proposing large 
economic benefits, could bring to a historically-preserved, culturally rich but 
economically challenged part of the city.  
Guarded Optimism 
 Thus, despite the reservations expressed by some, such as Alfred Liu, who 
were worried about the potential disintegration of an overtly Chinese character to the 
7th Street area, others in the community welcomed the economic prospects of the 
arena with a sense of guarded optimism and a fading need to preserve th  Chinese 
history of the place. Yeni Wong, who moved to Washington D.C. in 1980, owned 
eight of the storefronts in Chinatown. Wong lived in Potomac, Maryland but felt “an 
obligation to Chinatown,” when she first invested in one of the Chinese restau ants 
downtown. Wong was told, “don’t sell food, buy land. Then you can play golf,” by 
one of her associates who taught her about the food-importing business. Wong 
proceeded to do so and became one of Chinatown’s largest landowners. Wong’s 
“obligation” to Chinatown and initial desire to cater to the Chinese design dreams of 
the mid 1980s was prevalent when she initially began plans for a development strip in 
Chinatown. Wong’s first plan for the development strip was to create a Chinese 
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market center, with Chinese food, furniture and art stores.119 However, by 1995 when 
she was interviewed by The Washington Post, Wong had changed her plans for this 
development strip to be specifically or solely Chinese-oriented. Wong indicated tha it 
was instead, likely to be held by fast-food franchises and or upscale restaurants, 
reflecting the changing attitude of many Chinatown business owners by the 1990s: 
“This is a free market system. You cannot demand that there will be a Chinese gift 
shop if nobody will visit it. We shouldn’t emphasize distinguishing ourselve  from 
other places. America is a melting pot. If I’m so concerned about preserving Chinese 
culture, I should stay in China.”120  
 Linda Lee, owner of Hunan Chinatown, located in downtown Chinatown 
which she opened in 1984, was one of the most vocal supporters of the new arena. 
Lee declared that the changes in Chinatown were for the better:  
“Assimilation in the mainstream of America is every immigrant’s 
dream. It is not avoidable. In a community where even first-generation 
immigrants take American first names, no one wants to live in a Chinese 
ghetto. If small Asian-owned businesses have to close, so be it, this is 
the economic system, I don’t think anybody should expect subsidized 
rent.”121  
 
Linda Lee’s support of the MCI Center was not just lip service; Lee operated a 
restaurant concession stand inside the Center and helped promote its c nstruction to 
other Chinese business owners. Her support was so strong that Abe Pollin presented 
her with a silver shovel and white hard hat, as mementoes of the groundbreaking on 
October 18, 1995 and the opening on December 2, 1997 of the MCI Center.122  
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 Linda Lee’s dream was realized when the MCI Center opened with
resounding success in December 1997. The sell-out crowds at the MCI Center’s 
opening National Basketball Association (NBA) game came not just o cheer on their 
home team, the Washington Wizards, but also to experience “this moment in history” 
which was going to “bring morale back to the city, bring money back to city.”123 One 
ticket-holder arrived two hours before the start of the Wizards game just so he could 
walk around the area: “this is event is at least as important as opening the Kennedy 
Center in reversing the decay of the city.”124 An added incentive that attracted the 
crowds to the MCI Center and encouraged pedestrian traffic along 7th Street was the 
renovations done to the Gallery Place/Chinatown Metro station. The entrance that 
used to be on 7th and G was moved to 7th and F Streets, three escalators and two 
elevators were added and the number of fare gates increased from four to 17. The old 
exit could handle about 14,000 people a day, but the new exits were designed to 
handle up to 10,000 in half an hour. These renovations cost up to $19 million but was 
paid for with Metro funds and with federal money, a significant indicator of the city 
as well as federal government’s belief in what the arena could do to help improve the 
economy of downtown D.C.125     
The ease of access, new restaurants and pubs, such as Fado, an Irish pub, a 
Starbucks and the large Discovery Channel store all seemed to live up to these hopes 
to attract tourists and other visitors seeking entertainment back to downtown, as 
indicated in the euphoric quotes from several visitors: John Schroeder of Alexandria 
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said, “This is a great addition to downtown, I’m looking forward to staying 
downtown after work for a game.” Joseph James of Woodbridge, who noted that his 
family did not come down to the city very much, was quoted as saying: “I know 
we’re going to be coming downtown a lot more.”126 
But was this just opening day excitement and the novelty of a new ar na and 
finally having a stadium in the District? How long did the euphoria last? Did the 
arena truly live up to the weight of expectations on its steel shoulders and help to 
revitalize the city in the way that Chinese restauranteurs, long-time District residents 
and federal and city officials dreamed? In February 1998, restauran s and coffee 
shops in Chinatown reported increases of 30 to 50 percent in their business ce the 
arena opened.127 Smaller business entrepreneurs in fields where image is crucial, were 
also attracted by the new street traffic and glimmering streetscape and opened up 
shop in the years after the arena opened. Studio-Spark, a graphic design firm moved 
their offices to one of Chinatown’s old rowhouses, where the large windo s of the 
historic structure allowed plenty of sunlight.128 Similarly, Jeff Lee and Peter Liu, of 
Lee and Liu Associates, a pair of young landscape architects with a small, eight-
person firm, wanted to move to the area because they were looking f r an urban 
neighborhood but also for “a high-ceilinged, older building, a dramatic building that 
would create light.”129 They managed to find the perfect location above the Riggs 
Bank (now Commerce Bank) located at 7th and I Street, where the building, built at 
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the turn of the 19th century, was described by historic preservationists as “excell nt 
examples of Romanesque revival style…of heavy rusticated ornament tion…and 
arcaded fenestration [providing] a means for organizing and articulating the um rous 
windows of the tall facades.”130  
The MCI Center thus seemed to be having the expected and hoped-for effect 
of drawing crowds of hungry, hockey-obsessed tourists and suburbanites to the
downtown area. But the MCI Center also seemed to have an indirect eff of 
subliminal advertising for an urban neighborhood that has all the amenities of a 
modern, commercial downtown but also the charm and exoticism of 19th century 
rowhouses and Chinatown. If the games and concerts attracted street traffic, the street 
traffic is what captured the attention of pedestrians who might have looked at 
Chinatown not just as a place to visit, but to work and develop. As Del Monte, the 
young designer running Studio-Spark, the graphic-design firm, noted, it was 
important for him to be “on the cutting edge” in his field of graphic design and 
Chinatown, was where “I think people are just now realizing what kind of place this 
is going to be.”131  
On a less glamorous, albeit equally important note, the MCI Center had the 
direct effect of increasing more mundane forms of employment in the downtown 
area. A 1999 study done on the economic impact of the MCI Center, based on data 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Center of Business and Economic Statistics’ 
Department of Employment Services and the MCI Center Human Resourc  
Division. According to the study, since 1997, the MCI Center had created 1,926 
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(1,526 new jobs plus 400 relocated jobs) for the District of Columbia. 25 percent of 
these jobs were professional (and the remaining were low-paying jobs that included 
ticket sellers, cashiers, bartenders, cleaners, retailers, etc) and 60 per cent of these 
newly created jobs were held by D.C. residents.132 Although the study was specific 
with regard to the increased job opportunities that the creation of the MCI Center 
brought about, it was more guarded, vague and less convincing about whether t  
MCI Center really expanded the District’s existing business base. According to the 
study’s statement of the problem, in order to analyze whether the MCI Center has 
expanded the existing business base, data had to be found to support the assertion that 
the MCI Center creates new business linkages with existing economic activities in the 
neighborhood and/or supplement existing businesses. The study declared th t the 
1,926 jobs created, confirmed that fact.133 However, the study did not provide any 
additional data for proving these linkages or supplements to the existing businesses in 
the neighborhood. Although this might have been beyond the scope of the study and 
its sources, the faint disappointment in the multiplier effects people had hoped to gain 
from the arena’s construction were voiced in a W shington Post article in May 1999. 
Velocity Grill, a restaurant in the MCI Center closed in May 1999. Joe Englert, owner 
of The Rock, a bar near the arena also noted that business was slower to pick up than 
in other cities such as San Antonio or Cleveland, where new stadiums had opened as 
well.134  However, some such as Linda Lee, the Chinese restaurant owner who 
supported the arena from the start, continued to voice staunch support and optimism: 
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“The MCI Center has built a consensus and confidence on the fate of th east end of 
downtown. I had expected that businesses would build up slowly. It is like any 
business. When you first start out, you have to build it.”135 Yet, particularly 
compelling in these studies of the economic impact of the arena is the lack of 
interviews or data collected of other businesses in the area, or even the smaller 
Chinese restaurants. This was perhaps a telling sign of the dwindling Chinese 
influence of the 7th Street area, that Washington Post reporters, who in previous years 
were eager to paint the picture of a dying Chinatown, no longer were willing, or even 
able, to find those who might have wanted to decry the changes that the arena had 
wrought.  
More Gallery Place, Less China Trade Center 
The Chinatown business elite had changed their attitudes and their vision by 
the 1990s. The arena was something to be welcomed, as became particularly apparent 
in an intriguing debate over a proposal by a developer to build a large retail, 
residential and movie entertainment complex next to the MCI Center, i  the hopes of 
pulling concert and sports traffic into its orbit and staying downtown a little longer. In 
February 1998, Alfred Liu sued Metro in U.S. District Court on charges of favoritism 
for selecting Western Development Corporation’s proposal to build a retail, 
residential and movie complex on the coveted site. Liu charged that Herbert Miller, 
head of Western Development Corporation, was selected because of his cl se ties to 
the city, since Miller was chairman of D.C. Mayor Marion Barry’s taskforce to 
                                                
135 Eric Lipton, “Arena Renaissance Hasn’t Happened; Despite Disappointments, Downtown 
Merchants Hope for Turnaround,” The The Washington Post, May 13, 1999. 
 79 
 
revitalize downtown.136 Liu further contended that Western Development 
Corporation’s proposal violated the city’s zoning guidelines to preserve Chinatown. 
In contrast, Liu’s failed proposal included a bid for a China Trade Center, on H Street 
NW would help to fulfill those city guidelines, which as we saw in previous chapters, 
Liu himself had helped to institute. Although we have no records indicating what 
might have occurred to Liu’s lawsuit,137 Western Development Corporation’s plans 
for the 7th and H site expanded to include a soon to be vacated D.C. city building at 
614 H St, and Liu clearly refused to surrender the cherished land he wanted to 
develop to maintain the architectural Chinese character of the neighborhood. In a 
meeting of the D.C. Council in August 1998, Liu, in opposition to the sale, claimed 
that “if the heart of Chinatown, 7th and H Street becomes a sports world or movie 
town or other names Miller chooses, we can be sure that Chinatown will be gone 
forever.”138  The Chinatown Steering Committee, the official voice of the committee 
to the D.C. government, also swung into action, writing a letter requesting that the 
District take competitive bids on 614 H Street. Although their letter did not 
specifically refer to Liu’s failed proposal for the China Trade Center, this would 
probably have been clearly in the minds of both the Chinatown Steering Committee 
and the D.C. government, since the proposal for an international trade complex 
featuring Chinese goods and other cultural events had been in the works in the early 
1990s before the real estate recession collapsed the plan.139 
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Although Liu and the Chinatown Steering Committee were unable to push the 
plan for a China Trade Center through, a walk through the giant movie cmplex at 7th 
and H Street today, with the giant lotus-like pagoda rising above the balcony of the 
luxury condominiums there, bears clear and towering testimony to the fact that the 
Chinatown Design Guidelines that Liu and the Chinatown Steering Committee had 
instituted had to be complied with. But the loss represents the changing fortunes and 
changing nature of the debate surrounding Washington, D.C.’s Chinatown. No more 
is it the black-and-white, ‘modern progress’ versus ‘historic cultural community’, but 
competing notions of what it means to develop the Chinatown area. The bonds of 
nostalgia that Washington-area Chinese had felt towards downtown Chinatown were 
loosening in the face of greater economic benefits of an arena. Some glimmers of 
Chinese influence still remained, but tended to be in smaller gestures and cultural 
events, such as the proposed Chinatown Park at the corner of 6th and I Street,140 or the 
way Adams National Bank hired a practitioner of feng shui to arrange its interiors and 
furnishings to ward off evil spirits and keep in positive energy when they opened their 
branch in Chinatown,141 rather than tied to the large-scale economic projects that Liu 
and the Chinatown Steering Committee proposed. 
The forces of international trade and providing residential amenities that 
prevailed through the 1980s, when the Chinatown Steering Committee was able to go 
from strength to strength, instituting design guidelines that all developers had to 
follow, or constructing a large Archway as a symbol of international friendship and 
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economic ties with Beijing, had slowed down in the 1990s. Instead, the new 
development trend was about entertainment economics – generating exc tem nt and 
providing a catalyst for city development, but of offices, restaurants d other 
entertainment retail, rather than residential services or trade centers focused on the 
outside world. The moment for a commercialized Chinatown had passed and what 
was left behind, the Archway, the street lamps and street signs, were, in a way, 
enduring cultural artifacts of a time period when city development and city revenue 
was caught up in the whirlwind of the global post-industrial economy, with its dreams 
of becoming a global hub in turn spurring dreams of making D.C.’s Chinatow  he 




Conclusion: Reading Chinatown Architecture 
 
As this study of D.C. Chinatown has shown, a spatial turn in scholarship on 
Chinese American histories and Chinatowns, particularly in the 1970s to the 1990s 
does not mean that there is a one-to-one relationship between the overt reasons 
behind a building’s façade and the local, global, economic and sociopolitical 
motivations behind its creation. Instead, architectural creations that purport to 
proclaim one form of identity can be led to reveal ambiguous and complex readings, 
when their historical, social and ethnic contexts of creation are taken into account.  
The story of D.C. Chinatown adds to the recently growing literature of the 
relationship between race and architecture, of how, as ethnic communities sought to 
solidify and transform their identities into one which encapsulated both their foreign 
heritage as well as their lived experience in America, public architecture and visual 
streetscapes became both conscious and unconscious sites for the ceation of 
community memory and public representation. However, this initial foray into the 
development history of D.C. Chinatown does engender questions for future research. 
The remarkable similarity between the rhetoric used in DC, Sydney, Victoria and 
other small Chinatowns for the uses of architecture during redevelopmnt throughout 
nations with Chinese communities naturally begs for there to be alarger, more 
comprehensive comparative study than this thesis could convey. A comparative study 
will help us see where there may be shared characteristics, of use to immigrant 
historians, for how Chinese immigrants shape and make sense of the spaces in which 
they find themselves in, no matter where they are. The difference between the case 
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studies could then point to what is unique about a particular regional context r time 
period in which immigrants settled and dispersed in a location.  
In D.C. Chinatown’s plans for redevelopment, we can see the yearning to 
create that ‘informal capital city’ and ‘ethnopolis’ on par with New York and San 
Francisco, to serve as a spatial touchstone for the local Chinese community’s identity. 
However, does this continue to hold true as satellite communities in Rockville and 
Wheaton in suburban Maryland take off as ethnic centers and begin to develop their 
own sense of history and place? What will happen when the teenagers who 
remembered D.C. Chinatown are replaced by teenagers who have fond memories of 
Rockville Pike, or Viers Mill Road instead? Just as this essay promotes the need to do 
understand the role of architecture in historic downtowns, we need to delve deeper 
into exploring the role of architecture in the suburbs. Although there may be less 
pedestrian streetscape given the sprawl, these visual markers, of shop signs and mall 
centers, will continue to evoke complex feelings of varied community identity. 
Finally, this study has focused predominantly on written, documentary 
sources to recreate the story of D.C. Chinatown and its redevelopment. On the one 
hand, the constraints of time has precluded the use of extensive oral history 
interviews to get the elusive perspective of Chinatown residents and others who are 
usually silenced in mainstream newspaper accounts or government records. However, 
this study has also focused on the documentary evidence to draw attention to the 
severe gap in the historical record and to promote awareness of the need to actively 
acquire and preserve the written records of Chinatown history. As useful as drawing 
upon oral memories of current residents are, if the focus on oral surveys then negate 
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the community’s desire to collect and preserve their written records, this will be a 
dereliction of a historian’s duty. Oral histories, as important as they are, can never be 
wholly free of bias and nostalgic recollection. They need to be considered in 
conjunction with written records and correspondence, which are created in the heat of 
the moment and can reflect the motivations and impulses of that moment, no matter 
how irrelevant or inaccurate they seem in hindsight. In addition, the writt n record of 
D.C. Chinatown often refers to the “Chinese community” – as though an entire bloc 
of people grouped together by their ethnicity, share the same motivations and 
impulses. As I have sought to demonstrate in this essay, the Chinese community can 
often be divided in their opinions with regard to historic preservation of the 
downtown Chinatown space, be it due to personal nostalgia, economic status or time
of their arrival in the U.S. Yet, many of the records I consulted an  the newspaper 
articles that describe the community do not always feel the need to distinguish the 
particular context of individual Chinatown residents. Further research is thus needed 
to contextualize the tangled voices in the written records. More administrative and 
organizational history of the CCBA can be done to further unveil how these 
Chinatown elite saw themselves in relation to the rest of the Chinatown; more 
documentation and archival outreach done to collect information on Eastern Wind, 
Asian American Arts and Media and other non-profit Chinatown groups that would 
help draw a fuller picture of Chinatown life.   
An increase in the scope and depth of the written history of the Chinatown 
community will also help to enhance the study of the visual element of Chinatown 
history. As much as I argue in this essay for the importance of architecture and 
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streetscape, visual aspect of architecture as a source of hist rical material makes it 
particularly prone to contemporary rather than historical readings, given that it exists 
through time and space. Thus the written element of Chinatown history, through plans 
and letters and reports contextualizing its creation and use, is the ource through 
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